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ABSTRACT 
 
The present thesis examines whether important corporate governance characteristics 
of British boards are related to corporate cash holdings/liquidity, firm performance and stock 
price crashes. By conducting this research, we examine the informational content for 
investors and policymakers of two important corporate governance characteristics: i) the 
number of directorships held by executive directors or directors’ “busyness”; ii) the level of 
gap in compensation companies pay to their CEO and other executive directors, or CEO “pay 
slice”.  
Chapter 2 examines the effect of board busyness on corporate cash holdings. We offer 
new insights by evaluating two conflicting views regarding the quality of service that busy 
directors provide to corporate boards and their impact on decision making. One view is that  
directors who simultaneously serve on multiple boards improve board decision making 
ability as they have better experience and business connections (reputational effect).The 
opposite view  is that directors  with multiple seats are “too busy to mind the business”, 
which creates  serious agency problems and leads into suboptimal corporate decisions 
(busyness effect). We analyse a large sample of UK listed companies over the 1997 to 2009 
period and document evidence supporting a non-linear relationship between our proxy for 
board busyness and corporate cash holdings. In line with the reputational effect, we find that 
companies with board members that hold seats in other companies maintain a higher level of 
cash, net cash and financial slack. This effect is present, however, only at low levels of board 
busyness. In line with the busyness effect, our findings suggest that as board busyness 
increases beyond a certain threshold, it negatively affects cash holdings, net cash and 
financial slack. 
Chapter 3 examines a relationship between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of 
the top five executive directors’ total compensation that is captured by CEO - and firm value 
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in the UK. CPS reflects the relative importance of CEO as well as the extent to which the 
CEO is able to extract rents
1
. CPS may also alter effectiveness of board performance by 
influencing cooperation and cohesiveness among its members. Using a large sample of UK-
listed companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, we document evidence supporting a negative 
relationship between CPS and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that high CPS is associated with agency problems, and is likely 
to impact negatively on the executive team’s spirit and motivation. Our results have major 
implications for the on-going debate on how to reform executive remuneration, and highlight 
the importance of considering remuneration issues at the board level, supporting the 
principles of UK Corporate Governance Code (2010).  
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
risk of stock price crash in UK firms. We use CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of the 
maximum top-five executives’ total compensation that goes to the CEO, and board ‘busyness’ 
– the proportion of board level directors who have three or more directorships , to evaluate 
the effect of these two important aspects of corporate governance on stock price crash risk.  
The CPS reflects relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is 
able to extract rents and expropriate shareholders wealth (expropriation effect). Board 
busyness may create a serious agency problem because directors are “too busy to mind the 
business”, allowing for executives’ short-termism and bad news hoarding (busyness effect). 
Stock price crash risk captures asymmetry in risk, especially downside risk, and is important 
for investment decisions and risk management (Kim et al., 2014). Using a large sample of 
UK listed companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, we document evidence supporting a 
positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk. In line with the 
                                                          
1
 Term “rent extraction” is often used in the corporate finance literature to denote the possibility of shareholders’ 
wealth expropriation by top managers including CEO (Bebchuk et al., 2003, Frydman and Saks, 2010 among 
others). This term has been introduced by economists to describe the increase in one’s wealth without actual 
wealth creation (Krueger, 1974).  
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expropriation and busyness effects, we find that companies with high CPS and high levels of 
board busyness are exposed to higher level of stock price crash risk. The fact that CPS 
positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong implication for the on-going debate 
on how to reform executive remuneration so that it provides the right incentives to directors. 
There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of 
directorships held by executives from our findings, as we argue that board effectiveness 
depends on the overall level of board business.  
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis, providing an overview of its contribution and 
empirical results and outlining their implications.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and structure of the thesis 
The present thesis examines how corporate governance characteristics of British 
boards are related to corporate cash holdings/liquidity, firm performance and stock price 
crashes. Corporate governance arrangements and performance of corporate boards have been 
widely discussed by policy makers, regulators, practitioners and academics. By conducting 
this research, we examine the informational content for investors and policymakers of two 
important corporate governance characteristics: i) the number of directorships held by 
executive directors or directors’ “busyness”; ii) the level of gap in compensation companies 
pay to their CEOs and other executive directors, or CEO “pay slice”. Despite the fact that 
these two issues attract significant attention from academics and practitioners, the research 
examining British companies is very limited.  Most of the existing empirical literature 
addresses these issues in the US context examining almost exclusively US-based companies. 
This thesis contributes significantly to the literature and has direct implication for the public 
debate by examining the importance of board busyness and CEO pay slice for investors, 
policy makers and regulators. There are only a few studies, that we are aware of, which 
constructs and utilizes comprehensive corporate governance dataset of companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. 
Chapter 2 examines a relationship between corporate cash holdings/liquidity and 
board “busyness”. To this end, Chapter 2 offers new insights by evaluating two conflicting 
views on the quality of service that busy directors provide to corporate boards and their 
impact on board effectiveness. One view claims that  directors who serve on multiple boards 
improve board decision making ability as they have better experience and business 
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connections (reputational effect).The opposite view  is that directors  with multiple seats are 
“too busy to mind the business”, which creates  serious agency problems (busyness effect). 
By analysing a large sample of UK listed companies over the 1997 to 2009 period, we 
document evidence supporting a non-linear relationship between our proxy for board 
busyness and corporate cash holdings/liquidity. In line with the reputational effect, we find 
that companies with board members that hold seats in other companies maintain a higher 
level of cash/liquidity. This effect is present, however, only at low levels of board busyness. 
In line with the busyness effect, our findings suggest that as board busyness increases further 
to a certain threshold, it negatively affects cash holdings/liquidity. 
Chapter 3 examines a relationship between CEO Pay Slice (CPS), the fraction of 
maximum top-five executive directors’ total compensation captured by CEO, and firm value 
in the UK. CPS could reflect the relative importance of CEO as well as the extent to which 
the CEO is able to extract rents. CPS could also alter effectiveness of board performance by 
influencing cooperation and cohesiveness among its members. Using a large sample of UK 
listed companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, Chapter 3 documents evidence supporting a 
negative relationship between CPS and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. The results 
from this chapter are consistent with the hypothesis that high CPS is associated with agency 
problems and impacts negatively on the executive team’s spirit and motivation. Chapter’s 3 
results have a strong implication for the on-going debate on how to reform executive 
remuneration and highlight the importance of considering remuneration issues at the board 
level supporting the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles. 
Chapter 4 examines a relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
stock price crash risk. We use CEO Pay Slice (CPS) and board busyness to evaluate the effect 
of corporate governance on stock crash risk.  The CPS could reflect the relative importance of 
CEO as well as the extent to which CEO is able to extract rents and expropriate shareholder 
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wealth (expropriation effect). Board busyness creates serious agency problems because 
directors are “too busy to mind the business” allowing for the executives’ short-termism and 
bad news hoarding (busyness effect). Using a large sample of UK listed companies over the 
1997 to 2010 period, Chapter 4 documents evidence supporting a positive relationship 
between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk. In line with the expropriation and 
busyness effect, we find that companies with high CPS and high level of board busyness are 
exposed to higher stock price crash risk. The fact that CPS positively impacts on stock price 
crash risk has a strong implication for the on-going debate on how to reform executive 
remuneration so that it provides the right incentives. There is also a direct implication for the 
public debate limiting the number of directorships held by executives from our findings, as 
we argue that board effectiveness depends on the overall level of board busyness. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarising main empirical results and outlining 
contribution to the existing literature.  The rest of Chapter 1 reviews the theoretical 
arguments and corresponding empirical results from the prevailing literature and positions 
this thesis relative to the most recent studies. 
1.2. Busy boards, corporate cash holdings and corporate liquidity 
In this study, we attempt to provide insights into how multiple directorships impact 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity. Recent theoretical and empirical research highlights the 
importance of busy directors for board process. Mace (1986), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), 
Loderer and Peyer (2002) among others show that busy directors are especially valuable in 
enhancing a board advisory and monitoring functions. Harris and Shimizu (2004) found that 
such directors are important source of knowledge and can, in particular, enhance acquisition 
performance. Field et al. (2013) demonstrate that directors with multiple board seats (due to 
their experience and contacts) are excellent advisors. Haunschild and Beckman (1998) argue 
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that directors with multiple directorships have positive effect on entire corporate system due 
to the innovation dissemination throughout a corporate network. 
There are several reasons why the presence of busy directors at the board level may 
positively affect corporate cash holdings/liquidity. Busy directors can use their external 
contacts for the advantage of the firm they serve and secure firm’s access to required external 
funds (Means, 1939; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Second, they 
manage corporate cash holdings/liquidity carefully because the external labour market 
evaluates directors by their “home” company performance, which is directly linked to 
cash/liquidity management. Third, executive directors with outside directorships, due to their 
experience and knowledge, represent competitive threat for the current CEO and, 
consequently, increase CEO performance incentives. Fourth, they are less dependent on their 
“home” CEO for career progression, and do not fear to provide information required for the 
board’s decision-making. 
To the contrary, Core et al. (1999), and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that 
directors can become overcommitted when serving on multiple boards.  Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006), Jiraporn et al. (2008) demonstrate that boards with busy directors are associated with 
lax corporate governance. The main reasons why holding of multiple directorships might 
negatively affect corporate cash holdings/liquidity are extensively discussed in the literature.  
It was found that directors with multiple seats cater for CEOs and multiple appointments 
correlate with excess CEO compensation (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Core et al., (1999). 
Busy directors are often absent from board meetings neglecting their duties by not taking part 
in the strategic decisions-making processes (Jiraporn et al., 2008). Number of board seats 
held by supervisory directors exhibits positive correlation with accounting fraud (Beasley, 
1996). Busy directors take care of their own reputation and depart from underperforming 
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companies. These findings imply  that there is an inadequate monitoring and lack of attention 
paid to key corporate issues. 
We attempt to provide insights into how multiple directorships impact corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity. We use cash, net cash and financial slack to proxy for cash 
holdings/liquidity and measure board busyness as a proportion of directors with three or more 
directorships on the board. In our tests, we control for the important corporate governance 
characteristics (independence, board size, board tenure, proportion of “imported” CEOs, 
directors’ age, and gender diversity) and for various firm characteristics (size, performance, 
dividends paid, and profitability). Throughout our analysis, we find consistent support for the 
proposition that relationship between busy boards and firm cash holdings/liquidity is non-
linear. Companies with board members that hold seats on other companies’ boards, maintain 
a high level of cash, net cash, and financial slack, in line with reputational effect. However, 
when board busyness reaches a certain threshold, a further increase in board busyness has a 
negative effect on cash, net cash and slack, implying a higher level of financial risk. 
Our findings contribute to the literature in four key ways. First, this study 
supplements existing research by expanding the understanding of relationship between firms’ 
cash holdings/liquidity and board busyness.  Second, while many scholars explore the role of 
busy directors and their contribution to the different aspects of business, we are unaware of 
any published research that investigates these issues using a UK-based sample. Third, 
previous research   almost exclusively focuses on impact of busy boards on firm performance 
and reputation. We add to this body of literature by arguing that multiple directorships affect 
company’s cash holdings/liquidity in a complex non-linear manner. Finally, it has a direct 
implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of directorships held by 
executives. National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a threshold of 
three directorships, and the Council of Institutional Investors (2002) argues that directors 
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with full-time jobs should not seat on more than two other boards in order to serve effectively. 
We argue that board effectiveness also depends on board busyness, i.e. on the proportion of 
the busy directors on the company board. 
1.3. CEO pay slice and firm value 
Executive compensation has been widely discussed by economics, psychology, 
sociology, and management scholars (see Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Gerhart and Rynes, 
2003, among others). Prior research in this area addresses issues related to executive pay 
level (differences between companies), pay structure (differences within a company) and 
payment delivery systems (different forms of payment). Considerable academic attention is 
given to the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Hall and Leibman, 1998; Bebchul and Fried, 2004, among others). The most recent academic 
research explores inequality in remuneration among top executives and its effect on a 
company’s outcomes. Academics identify interesting aspects of compensation inequality, 
such as executives’ remuneration dispersion and CEO pay slice (a proportion of total 
compensation paid to top-five executives received by a CEO) and argue that they can affect 
corporate performance (see Lee et al., 2008; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Zalewska, 2014a; 
Frydman and Saks, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011). However, results from the analysis of the 
pay inequality – firm performance relationship are ambiguous. Lee et al. (2008) and Frydman 
and Saks (2010) argue that higher level of pay disparity improves performance and firm 
growth prospective, but Zalewska (2014a) and Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that pay disparity 
can be detrimental to the board effectiveness and firm performance. 
The wake of corporate scandals around “fat cats” compensation packages in Britain2 
is a timely reminder that pay-performance problem in the UK context requires further 
                                                          
2
 See BBC News-Business: “High Pay of UK executives corrosive, report says”, 22nd  November 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15827683 
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attention.  Executive pay has become a major issue in recent years in the UK, with 
shareholders questioning high salaries received by directors
3
.  British government has been 
very proactive in tackling compensation-related problems. Thus, in 2002, the UK was the 
first country to mandate an annual non-binding shareholder vote on directors’ remuneration 
(“say on pay”) to improve the “accountability, transparency, and performance linkage of 
executive pay” (Baird and Stowasser, 2002). In September, 2013, the government has gone 
one step further and introduced a mandatory “say on pay”. Shortcomings in regulation of 
compensation-related issues have been also addressed by the Corporate Governance Code 
2010 (The Code), with the particular attention being paid to the importance of establishing 
connection between director’s remuneration and firm performance4. 
Despite the fact that a body of literature on executives’ remuneration grows, there is 
only a handful of studies examining the effect of different aspects of directors’ compensation 
on firm performance using UK data. Thus, Main et al. (1996) consider cash and equity-based 
components of executive compensation for a sample of sixty UK-based companies over the 
1983 – 1989 time period. Conyon and Sadler (2001) analyse a small sample of UK 
companies and find a weak evidence of the positive relationship between executives’ pay 
inequality and firm performance. Gregg et al. (2005) find an asymmetric link between cash 
compensation and performance using sample of large UK companies and argue that a 
relationship between executives’ total compensation and share performance is weak. Ozkan 
(2009) examines the link between CEO pay and firm performance using a sample of 390 
companies from FTSE All Shares Index for the period 1999-2005. She reports positive and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
3
 See The Wall Street Journal – Business: “U.K. Unveils Plan on Executive Pay”, 20th June, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304765304577478172485959522 
4
 Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: “levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain, and 
motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying 
more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be 
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (The UK Corporate Governance 
Code, June 2010: p.22). 
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significant relationship between CEO’s cash compensation and performance but lack of 
connection between total compensation and firm performance. 
There are two most recent studies focusing on pay inequality using UK-based data 
that are of particular interest and relevance to our research. Correa and Lel (2014) investigate 
the effect of “say on pay” law on the executives’ compensation, CPS and firm value using a 
large cross-country sample from 39 countries including UK. The authors find that CEO pay – 
firm performance link becomes stronger, and that companies with high CPS, experience 
significant improvement in performance upon implementation of the law. Zalewska (2014a) 
analyses the link between remuneration dispersion at executive board level and firm 
performance using a large sample of British companies. She unveils a negative relationship 
between remuneration dispersion and performance
5
 contrary to the findings from the 
American studies. Zalewska (2014a) urges that findings based on American data are not 
always universal and must be treated with extreme caution in cases when researches’ and 
policy makers’ advice is to be applied to companies outside the US boundaries. 
Motivated by The Code and the discussion around the “say on pay” law, we aim to 
shed additional light on the link between executives’ compensation and a firm performance in 
the UK context. In our analysis, we control for important corporate governance 
characteristics (board composition, board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, and board 
busyness) and for various firm characteristics (company age, company size, ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets, and leverage). Throughout our analysis, we find consistent 
support for the proposition that higher CPS is associated with lower firm value measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Our results indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for research on firm 
                                                          
5
 This is the first study that documents a negative relationship between the remuneration dispersion and 
performance. All previous studies were in agreement that the higher pay dispersion improves firm outcomes 
(see Kale et al., 2009; Rankin and Sayre, 2011 among others).  
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performance, and that its relation with the value of firms is an important issue to be 
considered in the UK context. 
Our work is related to different streams in literature. First, there is a clear evidence 
from the literature that proportion of compensation received by CEO has been trending up 
over time (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005, Frydman and Saks, 2010 among 
others). We add to this literature by investigating the relationship between CPS and firm 
performance in the UK context. Second, we extend the literature analysing the association 
between different corporate governance characteristics and Tobin’s Q. Academics discuss 
impact of large boards (Yermack, 1996), the presence of staggered boards (e.g., Bebchuk and 
Cohen, 2005), and the weakness of shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 
2009) on firm outcomes and find negative association between these corporate governance 
characteristics and Tobin’s Q. We contribute to this literature by considering another aspect 
of governance arrangement, CPS, and its impact on firm performance. Finally, our work 
enhances the literature that analyses different CEO qualities and characteristics and their 
effect on firm outcomes. We highlight CPS as an important feature, which can provide 
additional insight into understanding of CEO compensation – firm performance link. This is 
one of the first studies that we are aware of, that discusses the above mentioned aspects in the 
UK context and investigates CPS – performance relationship using a broad UK-based sample. 
1.4. Corporate governance and stock price crash risk 
Within the rapidly developing research area on corporate governance, a significant 
proportion of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature has concentrated on studying 
the specificities of the relationship between governance characteristics and stock price crash 
risk. Stock price crash risk reduces the chance that shareholders will receive proceeds from 
the firm’s future investments and affects manager through the part of their wealth that is tied 
to the value of firm (Gormley et al., 2013). When cash flow falls below investors’ 
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expectations, managers tend to hide bad news in order to protect their own wealth, human 
capital, and jobs (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom, 1979; Benmelech et al., 2010; 
Gormley and Matsa, 2011). However, when the negative firm-specific information 
(suddenly) becomes publicly available, the stock price drops dramatically (Jin and Myers, 
2006) and stock price crash risk increases. A considerable body of literature suggests that 
corporate governance mechanisms can help to prevent such a suboptimal managerial 
behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Healy et al., 1999) and significantly reduce stock price 
crashes by disciplining investments (Masulis et al., 2007), preventing earnings management 
(Xie et al., 2003), improving information disclosure process (Armstrong et al., 2012; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and by aligning interests of managers and shareholders using 
carefully structured incentive compensation packages (Benmelech et al., 2010 among others). 
Benmelech et al. (2010) demonstrate that CEO’s stock-based compensation can cause 
a stock price crash. They argue that CEOs of medium – to high-growth firms initially have to 
invest intensively in order to make a best use of growth opportunities.  As soon as growth rate 
slows down, CEO could camouflage growth decline by making suboptimal investment 
decisions, resulting in undercapitalisation and subsequent stock price collapse. An and Zhang 
(2013) in their empirical study exploit the relationship between institutional investors’ 
ownership and stock price crash risk, and conclude that strong monitoring by dedicated 
institutional investors attenuates managerial bad-news hoarding and prevents rapid stock 
price drop. Andreou et al. (2013) consider several corporate governance characteristics and 
their effect on firm-specific stock price crashes. They find that future stock price crashes are 
positively related to the institutional ownership, percentage of directors who hold company’s 
shares, and opacity of financial reports. Gormley et al. (2013) find that structure of 
managerial compensation has an important effect on managerial motivation to induce firm’s 
11 
 
level of risk and on how firm responds to stock price crash risk
6
.  Still, research on corporate 
governance and stock price crash risk outside the US is very limited. 
In this study, we attempt to shed additional light on the link between corporate 
governance and stock price crashes in the UK context. In particular, we investigate whether a 
pay inequality between CEO and other top executives, measured by CPS, as well as board 
busyness affect stock price crash risk of British companies. In our analysis we use a large 
sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. We control for 
important corporate governance characteristics, such as board composition, board size, CEO 
duality, and CEO tenure; we also control for various firm characteristics, such as company 
size, ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, and leverage. 
Throughout our analysis, we find consistent support for the proposition that high CPS 
and board busyness are associated with high stock price crash risk. High CPS level could be 
due to agency problems in a firm with powerful and influential CEO, who is able to stockpile 
negative information from the market for financial (expropriation of rents through the 
compensation arrangements)
7
 or non-financial reasons (e.g., empire building with the view to 
expropriate rents in future)
8
. Upon realisation of this (negative) information by the market, 
company’s stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). In addition, high 
CPS could demotivate managers next to the CEO, destroy team cooperation within the board 
room, and lead to poor board and firm performance (social comparison effect, which is 
especially pronounced on the British boards
9
).  In turn, busy boards are associated with weak 
corporate governance and also contribute to the agency problem
10
. Therefore, companies with 
                                                          
6
 Gormley et al. (2013) recommend that boards, when they design managerial compensation packages, should 
consider the potential changes in companies’ risk environment and how the executives will respond given their 
compensation.  
7
 See Kothari et al., 2009.  
8
 See Ball, 2001. 
9
 See Zalewska (2014a,b) for detailed discussion of the UK board mechanisms and structures.  
10
 See Gilson (1990), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) (1996), 
Beasly (1996), Cotter et al. (1997), Core et al. (1999), Brown and Maloney (1999), Shivdasni and Yermack 
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busy corporate boards experience high stock price crash risk. Our findings indicate that CPS 
and board busyness can provide a useful tool for research on stock price crash risk, and is an 
important issue to be considered in the UK context. 
Our work is related to several streams in literature. First, literature provides an 
evidence that proportion of compensation received by CEOs has been trending up over time 
(Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005, Frydman and Saks, 2010 among others). We 
add to this literature by investigating the relationship between CPS and stock price crash risk 
in the UK context. Second, we extend the literature analysing the association between 
different corporate governance characteristics and crash risk. Thus, academics discuss the 
impact of large shareholders and institutional investors (An and Zhang, 2013), the opacity of 
financial reports (Hutton et al., 2009), and CEO incentives and power (Kim et al., 2011a) on 
stock price crash risk.  We contribute to this literature by considering other aspects of 
governance, such as CPS and board busyness, and their impact on stock price crash risk. 
Finally, our work enhances the literature that analyses different CEO qualities and 
characteristics and their effect on firm outcomes. We highlight CPS and board busyness as 
important features, which can provide additional insight into governance - stock price crash 
risk dynamics.  The study in Chapter 4 is the first study that we are aware of, highlighting the 
above mentioned aspects using the UK-based sample. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1999), Miwa and Ramseyer (2000), Bohren and Strom (2010), Ferris et al. (2003), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), 
Cooper and Uzun (2012). 
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CHAPTER 2 
Busy boards, cash holdings and corporate liquidity: Evidence from 
UK panel data 
2.1. Introduction 
A large body of literature focuses on the role of boards of directors in 
corporate governance (see Adams et al., 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 for 
comprehensive reviews of the literature). Recent theoretical and empirical research 
highlights the importance of directors with multiple directorships (“busy” directors) 
for board process: Mace (1986), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), and Loderer and Peyer 
(2002), among others, argue that their presence improves board advisory and 
monitoring functions; Harris and Shimizu (2004) find that these directors are 
important source of knowledge and can, in particular, enhance acquisition 
performance; Field et al. (2013) argue that directors with multiple board seats are 
excellent advisors (due to their experience and contacts) and are on demand by IPO 
firms.  Haunschild and Beckman (1998) argue that busy directors positively 
contribute to the entire corporate system by the disseminating of innovations 
throughout corporate networks. 
Other scholars are more sceptical about positive contribution of busy directors to a 
firm value. Core et al. (1999), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Falato et al. (2014) 
suggest that directors serving on multiple boards can become overcommitted and are unable 
to provide meaningful managerial monitoring. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Jiraporn et al. 
(2008) find that boards with busy directors are positively associated with lax corporate 
governance; and Jiraporn et al. (2006) argue that boards with busy directors lead to a weak 
corporate performance and low firm valuation. 
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The link between board busyness and corporate cash holdings/liquidity remains 
largely unexplored in empirical literature. This paper is based on the notion that firms’ boards 
of directors play important roles in their corporate cash/liquidity management. One of the 
corporate boards’ main responsibilities is to ensure the effective cash management by 
designating the range of cash reserves that should be held under the managerial control. Non-
operational cash holding is a hedging mechanism against “future cash flow shocks in bad 
times” (Lins et al., 2010) and acts as a general corporate insurance policy11. Busy directors 
can assist companies with cash holdings/liquidity management in the following ways. First, 
directors with multiple directorships and good business connections can secure a competitive 
advantage of the company in access to financing when required (Means, 1939; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Second, they represent potential competitive 
substitutes for their current CEOs due to their experience and knowledge, which can motivate 
CEOs to achieve more effective cash management and improved liquidity
12
. Third, busy 
directors depend less on the ‘home’ CEO for their career progression and can enhance board 
effectiveness by not being inhibited from providing their board of directors with all important 
information
13
. 
However, holding multiple directorships might negatively affect board members’ 
monitoring and advisory capacities for the following reasons. First, directors with multiple 
seats may be inclined to serve CEO’s interests. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Core et al. 
(1999), and Falato et al. (2014) argue that the number of board members’ additional 
directorships is positively correlated with excess CEO rent extraction. Second, busy directors 
                                                          
11
 Lins et al. (2010) found that companies hold excess cash “as a buffer against future cash flow shortfalls”; this 
is seen as a general reason that CFOs rank as a very important, and “does not refer to any particular outcome 
stemming from future cash flows that might worry a firm” (p.166).  
12
 Fich (2005) and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) advise that CEOs tend to perform better if subject to internal 
competition. 
13
 Fich (2005) and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) stress that directors with outside directorships tend to provide 
good quality information to the board regardless of a CEO’s will; this results in boards being better informed  
and thus better able to assess and advise on effective cash management. 
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often fail to attend board meetings, and so neglect their duties by not taking part in the 
important strategic decision-making process (Jiraporn et al., 2009a, Falato et al., 2014). Third, 
Beasley (1996) finds that the number of board seats held by supervisory directors is 
positively correlated with accounting fraud, which appears to indicate a lack of attention from 
these directors. Fourth, busy directors tend to defend their own reputations by leaving 
underperforming companies, suggesting that the presence of overstretched directors on 
boards depends on firm performance (Brown and Maloney, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
In this study, we attempt to provide insights into how board busyness affects firms’ 
cash holdings and liquidity. We measure board busyness as proportion of directors who hold 
three or more directorships (who we term “busy” directors). We control for such important 
corporate governance characteristics as independence, board size, and board tenure, the 
presence of directors who are (or have previously been) CEOs in other companies (‘imported’ 
CEOs), directors’ age, and gender diversity. We also control for various firm characteristics 
(size, performance, dividends paid, and profitability). We use a large sample of 1,275 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1997 and 2009. Our empirical 
methodology includes estimation of panel data using pooled OLS model, fixed effects model 
with robust standard errors, fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered by 
industry affiliation, Fama-MacBeth model, and fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998) standard errors, which are robust to  the general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence (Hoechle, 2007). Our analysis gives consistent support for the proposition that 
the relationship between busy boards and firm cash holdings/liquidity is non-linear. In 
particular, companies with board members that hold seats on other companies’ boards 
maintain high levels of cash holdings/liquidity, in line with a reputational effect. However, 
after a certain threshold, a further increase in board busyness affects cash holdings/liquidity 
in a negative way. 
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This study contributes to the literature in the following key ways. First, our findings 
corroborate earlier research establishing a link between board busyness and firm cash 
holdings/liquidity. Second, while many scholars have explored the role of busy directors and 
their contributions to different aspects of business, we are unaware of any published research 
that investigates this link using the UK-based sample. The recent financial crisis revealed 
shortcomings in businesses’ typical approaches to corporate risk management which have 
now been addressed by the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, which defined boards’ 
responsibilities in relation to their oversight of firms’ risk. Companies with well managed 
cash reserves are associated with lower cash flow volatility (see Froot et al., 1994; Lins et al., 
2010 among others), which implies that these companies are less exposed to the risk of 
underinvestment. Third, extant research has focused almost exclusively on the impact of busy 
directors on firm performance and reputation: we add to this body of literature by showing 
that multiple directorships also affect company’s cash holdings and liquidity. Finally, our 
study has direct implications for the public debate on limiting the number of directorships. 
The National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) has suggested a threshold of three 
directorships, while the Council of Institutional Investors (2002) argues that directors with 
full-time jobs should not hold seats on more than two other boards. We add to this debate by 
finding that overall level of board busyness affects board functioning and performance in a 
non-linear manner. 
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. We provide a theoretical 
background and develop our hypotheses in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 contains the sample 
description and summary statistics. Section 2.4 outlines our findings on the relationships 
between board busyness and corporate cash holdings and liquidity. Section 2.5 concludes. 
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2.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
We consider two alternative views on the role that busy directors play in their 
companies. First, referred to as the reputational effect (Jiraporn et al., 2009a), originates from 
the resource dependence theory, and reflects the view that companies prefer to employ busy 
directors due to their greater advisory and monitoring experience and useful networks of 
business contacts. Cook and Wang (2011) argue that multiple directorships signal a director’s 
exceptional abilities
14
. External labour market acknowledges superior managerial skills and 
talent, so it allows us to take the number of external board seats a director holds as a proxy 
for the reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shivdasani, 1993; Brown and Maloney, 1999; 
Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). Directors with multiple directorships can benefit firms by helping 
executives to develop expertise, learn about different management styles and strategies, and 
build up their professional networks (Bacon and Brown, 1974; Booth and Deli, 1996). Busy 
directors can use their external contacts to enhance the firm’s reputation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), to open new markets (Means, 1939), and to secure a competitive advantage in 
accessing funds (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the reputational effect can also 
be an important incentive for directors themselves. Ferris et al. (2003) find a positive 
relationship between the number of directorships board members hold and firm performance. 
Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that directors with outside directorships lead to the superior 
board decision making ability and thus better company performance. They argue that 
directors with multiple directorships play a special role on their boards. First, busy directors 
have valuable experience and knowledge and so represent a competitive threat to a current 
CEO.  Second, additional directorships broaden executives’ career opportunities and lessen 
                                                          
14
 Cook and Wang (2011) argue that by participating on the multiple boards, directors become better informed, 
which allows them to use information they gain from wider contacts to make better trading decisions. They 
examine whether superior performance depends on “informativeness” or on their personal abilities, and find that 
performance depends on the individual abilities. 
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their dependence on the ‘home’ CEO for the progression, so making them freer to express 
views that challenge those of the CEO. Third, the labour market opportunities motivates 
directors to perform better within their ‘home’ companies, as poor performance will tend to 
limit their access to additional directorships, career and reputational benefits. By using their 
experience gained at other companies, busy directors can recognise problems faster, minimise 
preparation time, and enhance performance in important corporate decisions, such as 
acquisitions (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Field et al. (2013) give evidence that new public 
firms prefer directors with established reputations, as they generally lack market navigating 
experience, and so rely heavily on busy directors’ expertise and contacts. Busy directors can 
also positively influence entire corporate systems by disseminating innovations through their 
networks (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). Considering the above arguments, we can put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Companies with busy boards maintain higher levels of cash 
holdings and corporate liquidity, ceteris paribus. 
The second view, referred to as busyness effect, on the role of busy directors comes 
from agency theory literature. Directors who overstretch themselves and take on additional 
directorships, are likely to spend less time on each individual board, so risking compromising 
their responsibilities and neglecting their duties (Ferris et al., 2003)
15
.  Core et al. (1999), 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006) criticise firms for appointing 
board members who hold multiple directorships, arguing that such individuals are likely to  
become overcommitted and so unable to monitor management effectively. Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) find negative association between a company’s performance and board 
                                                          
15
 See also Gilson (1990), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), National Association of Corporate Directors (1996), 
Beasley (1996), Cotter et al. (1997), Core et.al. (1999), Brown and Maloney (1999), Shivdasni and Yermack 
(1999), Miwa and Ramseyer (2000), Bohren and Strom (2010), Ferris et al. (2003), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), 
Cooper and Uzun (2012), and Falato et al. (2014) who challenge the wisdom of holding too many directorships 
by examining busy boards’ effectiveness. 
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busyness
16
.  Falato et al. (2014) examine the implication of director busyness on shareholder 
wealth, and find the evidence that independent director busyness is detrimental to board 
monitoring ability and shareholder value. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) argue that lax 
monitoring by busy directors can allow CEOs to increase agency costs, and find that busy 
directors are most likely to be chosen if the CEO is involved in the board selection process. 
Core et al. (1999) argue that busy directors are more likely to set high compensation for the 
CEO.  Perry and Peyer (2005) and Ferris et al. (2003) find that directors see additional 
directorships as good opportunities to improve their incomes before retirement. If the service 
busy directors provide, is of poor quality, they are not usually penalised, due to their close 
proximity to retirement. Beasley (1996) identifies a positive relationship between accounting 
fraud and the number of directorships held by outside board members. Jiraporn et al. (2009 
a,b) find that firms with busy boards are, on average, more diversified and so may suffer from 
diversification discount. They argue that busy directors serve on fewer board committees, and 
that this lack of full involvement in board business can cause firms values to decline. Cooper 
and Uzun (2012) provide consistent evidence showing the positive relationship between busy 
directors and bank’s riskiness. Christy et al. (2013) find a negative relationship between 
market risk of equity and multiple directorships held by non-executive board members. Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) report high cumulative abnormal returns around days when the 
departures of busy directors are announced, interpreting these results as evidence that 
investors welcome such departures
17
. 
Kaczmarek et al. (2012) adapt the notion of ‘faultlines’18 from social identity 
                                                          
16
 Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that increasing number of busy directors leads to board distraction and 
subsequent decline in monitoring intensity. They also find that company’s share price drops when executive 
directors overstretch themselves by accepting additional board seats. 
17
 The study uses a resignation of Elaine L. Chao (who served as an outside director on boards of six companies) 
as an example.  
18
 Group faultlines are defined as hypothetical dividing lines that split a group into relatively homogeneous sub-
groups based on group members’ alignment according to various attributes (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Lau & 
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theory to their analyses of board effectiveness. They find that faultlines can deteriorate board 
performance, and that deterioration effect magnifies in the presence of boards with large 
number of busy directors. Kaczmarek et al. (2012: 341) note that busy directors  pay less 
attention and have less time to spend on important board issues, increasing “salience of 
divisions based on task-related attributes ... Such a course of events is therefore  detrimental 
for the cohesiveness and communication of the board as a whole”. Based on the above 
arguments we can hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 2: Companies with busy boards of directors maintain lower 
levels of cash/liquidity, ceteris paribus. 
By considering reputational effect and busyness effect simultaneously, we argue that 
the link between board busyness and level of cash holdings/liquidity may not be fully 
captured by a simple linear relationship. We expect reputational effect to dominate when the 
level of board busyness is low but, in line with the busyness effect, as board’s busyness 
increases beyond a certain threshold, it will affect corporate cash holdings and liquidity 
negatively. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between board 
busyness and corporate cash holdings/liquidity. 
2.3. Sample selection and data description 
2.3.1. Sample selection 
Our analysis is based on a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. We collect firms’ financial and market information from Thomson 
Datastream, and directors’ information from BoardEx database. The sample period is from 
1997 to 2009, and includes all firms whose information is available from these two databases. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Murnighan, 1998, 2005), and are most likely to emerge when group diversity is moderate (Earley & 
Mosakokowski, 2000; Lau & Murninghan, 1998; Webber & Donahue, 2001), Kaczmarek et al. (2012: 338).  
21 
 
We collect information about the following financial and market items at the end of each 
year: earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortisation (EBITDA), cash, cash and marketable securities, accounts receivable, 
accounts payables, inventories, cash dividends paid (total), dividends provided/paid 
(common), preferred dividend requirement, deferred taxes, total assets, market value, and 
value of common shareholders equity. Information about directors include: director’s name, 
age, gender, role title and role description, indication of whether they are executive or 
supervisory directors, and number of other directorships held. We obtain 98,315 director-year 
observations covering approximately 1,500 firms, or 12,432 firm-years, over our 13-years 
sample. We use companies’ ISIN identifiers to merge data from Thomson Datastream and 
BoardEx
19
. We then excluded financial firms (Thomson Datastream ICBIC code 8000), 
which are highly regulated, and so ended up with an unbalanced panel of 1,275 firms and 
8,296 firm-year observations over the 1997 to 2009 period. 
We use cash, net cash, and financial slack, all normalised by book value of total assets, 
to test the impact of board busyness on corporate cash holdings/liquidity. Specifically, cash is 
the value of cash and short-term investments; net cash is a difference between value of cash 
and short-term investments and total company debt, and the financial slack measure is based 
on traditional credit line arrangements that enable firms to access operating loans up to the 
value of fifty per cent of their inventories and seventy per cent of their accounts receivable 
(Cleary, 1999). We follow Ferris et al. (2003) in our definition of busy boards, and consider 
board as “busy” if the percentage of directors with three or more directorships (“busy 
directors”) is greater than or equal to the sample median. We also control for firm size, 
dividend, profitability, and Tobin’s Q in our analysis. We collect information about the 
                                                          
19
 We used company names as identifiers to collect ISINs from Thomson Datastream, and carefully consider all 
available relevant company information (market, stock exchange, delisting date, etc.) with a high level of 
discretion to assign correct ISIN.  
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governance structure of firms, such as a proportion of supervisory directors on the board, 
CEO/Chairman duality, board size, average board tenure, and proportion of ‘imported’ CEOs, 
gender diversity, and average directors’ ages to use as control variables in our study. We 
provide all variable definitions in Table 2.1.  Table 1 in the Appendix gives a sample 
calculation example for Board Busyness. 
2.3.2. Data description and summary statistics 
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics, separating data according to variables describing 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity (Panel A), director characteristics and board structure 
(Panel B), and firm characteristics (Panel C). Cash and short-term investments represent 
17.37 percent of average firms’ total assets, although some firms hold the equivalent of 100 
percent of company value in cash, and some have no cash at all. In the average firm, net cash 
figure is a negative 0.88 percent, and financial slack is 24 percent of total firm assets. 
Directorships per director range from 1 to a maximum of 6.33 - but, on average, directors in 
our sample have board responsibilities at 1.87 firms. The mean (median) proportion of 
directors holding three or more directorships per board is approximately 21.73 percent (18.18 
percent) of all board members, ranging from zero to 100 percent. The average number of 
directors on the boards of our sample firms is 7.90, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 
16. The average board tenure is 5.47 years, with a maximum of 17 years and minimum of 0.3 
years. On average, 58.17 percent of our sample boards’ members are supervisory directors.  
“Imported” CEOs represent 4% of directors on the average board. Some boards have as many 
as 67 percent of imported CEOs, and others have none at all. 6 percent of directors are female, 
a proportion which varies from 0 to 60 percent. Average director’s age is 54.23 years, with a 
minimum age of 34 and a maximum of 69.80 years old. The CEOs and Chairs were the same 
person on the 13.22 percent of our sample firms’ boards. 
Firm size is, on average, 12.52; average firm profitability is 0.09 (i.e., EBITDA is 9 
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percent of total asset values). The average sample company pays dividends representing 2.1 
percent of the value of total assets, and has a Tobin’s Q of 2.15. 
2.3.3. Univariate results 
Table 2.3 presents univariate comparisons of key descriptive variables by cash/net 
cash/slack quartiles. We are interested in the difference between firms in first and fourth 
quartiles of cash/net cash/slack, and use a t-test to test the hypothesis that the fourth-quartile 
firms are significantly different from the first quartile firms. 
Panels A, B, and C report results of key corporate governance and firm variables by 
Cash (Panel A), Net Cash (Panel B), and Slack (Panel C) quartiles. Firms with less cash/net 
cash/financial slack, i.e. in the first quartile, differ significantly from the firms with the most 
cash/net cash/ financial slack, i.e., firms in the fourth quartile. Board Busyness declines 
monotonically from the first quartile to the fourth quartile of Net Cash and Slack. Firms with 
the most Net Cash and Slack have the least busy boards. However, firms with the most Cash 
have boards that are only marginally busier than firms with the least Cash in Panel A, as both 
reputational theory and agency theory would predict. These findings point to a negative 
relation between board busyness and corporate cash holdings, but do not rule out the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship. 
Board size changes in line with the company size from the first to the fourth quartiles 
of cash holdings, but this change is not monotonic. Companies in the first quartile of Cash, 
Net Cash and Slack measures have boards that are substantially larger than those of 
companies in the fourth quartile. Board tenure declines monotonically from the first to the 
fourth quartile of cash holdings in Panel A, but is not monotonic in Panels B (Net Cash), and 
C (Slack). The Proportion of Supervisory directors on boards increases monotonically from 
the first to the fourth quartile of cash holdings in Panel A, which is consistent with the view 
that board independence (the higher proportion of supervisory directors on the board) could 
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reduce agency costs of cash expropriation. However, it is a case only in Panel A. Panels B 
and C show mixed results. Board tenure declines from the first to the fourth quartile in Panel 
A, and remains nearly the same in Panel C (Panel B provides mixed results). The proportion 
of “imported” CEOs increases gradually from the first to the fourth quartile in Panel A, 
suggesting that more experienced directors can help to reduce the agency costs associated 
with higher levels of cash holdings; although this proportion remains constant over the four 
quartiles in Panels B and C. The difference in director’s age between firms in the first and 
fourth quartiles is marginal but statistically significant at the 10% level in Panel A and at the 
5% level in Panel B, but is insignificant in Panel C. 
Firms with the most cash (net cash and slack) are generally smaller than those with 
the least cash (net cash and slack). Firm size decreases gradually from the first to the fourth 
quartile of Net Cash (in Panel B). However, the univariate relation between cash and slack 
and firm size is not monotonic in Panels A or C, with firms in the fourth quartile of cash and 
slack measures representing the smallest companies in the sample. Firms in the first quartile 
of Cash pay larger dividends than the firms in the fourth quartile, but firms pay 
approximately same dividends in all the quartiles of Net Cash and Slack measures. Tobin’s Q 
measure increases monotonically but only in Panel A (Cash).  Companies in the fourth 
quartiles have significantly lower profitability than companies in the first quartiles over all 
three liquidity measures. 
2.4. Methodology and results 
In this section we examine whether company cash holdings and liquidity are affected 
by the board busyness. We use three proxies to measure cash holdings/liquidity - Cash, Net 
Cash, and Financial Slack
20
. Board Busyness is measured as the proportion of company 
directors who hold seats on three or more company boards (including the focal board). We 
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 We use annually industry-adjusted variables in our analysis (we compute each industry’s mean per year and 
subtract it from the corresponding firm-level variable in each case). 
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include a quadratic term of board busyness, Board Busyness
2 
to capture the potential non-
linear relationship between board busyness and corporate cash holdings/liquidity. We follow 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Bohren and Strom (2010), Masulis and Mobbs (2011) and 
Cooper and Uzun (2012) in taking account of a range of control variables. Thus, we include 
Proportion of SD - the proportion of supervisory directors on a firm’s board. Boards with 
higher proportion of supervisory directors are better monitors; consequently, they and so may 
better monitor and advise on a firm’s accumulation and utilisation of vital cash recourses 
more effectively. We include the natural logarithm of board size (Ln [Board Size]) to control 
for board size. Resource dependence theory suggests that larger boards have more valuable 
connections and larger pools of expertise to draw on (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). 
However, scholars have provided conflicting evidence on the relations between board size 
and company performance, with some (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Dalton et al., 1998; Jackling 
and Johl, 2009) documenting positive, and others (Yermack, 1996; Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004) negative associations. We also include a variable indicating whether CEO and 
Board Chair is the same person (Duality), which is often used in the corporate governance 
literature. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) suggest that Board Tenure negatively impacts firm 
performance, so we consider this variable as a determinant of cash holdings and liquidity. We 
also consider Imported CEO variable in line with Bohren and Strom (2010). Directors’ Age is 
included as it might approximate the experience as well as the useful networks directors can 
bring to their companies (Ferris et al., 2003). Older directors might be better monitors, but 
directors near retirement age are inclined to accept additional directorships at the expense of 
their monitoring quality (Perry and Peyer (2005), Ferris et al. (2003)). Board diversity 
(Gender) measures the proportion of female directors on the board. Carter et al. (2003) 
suggest that diversity at the board room increases independence and improves decision 
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making process.
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We also include the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln[Total Assets]) to control for 
firm size. Lins et al. (2010) argue that smaller firms might require higher levels of cash 
reserves due to their comparatively larger transaction costs, higher levels of information 
asymmetry, and poorer access to capital markets. We also include Dividend Payout and two 
measures of profitability, Tobin’s Q and Profitability (a ratio of EBITDA to total assets), to 
control for the difference in management quality across firms, since high volatility in 
profitability may signal poor management skills and competence (Faccio et al., 2001). We 
include industry dummy variables using FTAG3 industry codes: their inclusion is appropriate 
given the inherent variability in cash/liquidity attributes across different industries. 
2.4.1. Methodology 
We use different estimation models in our analysis: a pooled OLS model, a fixed 
effects model, a Fama-MacBeth model, and a fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998) standard errors. The pooled OLS model (Model 1) can be expressed in the following 
form: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
2
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽8𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡   
+ 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
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 The Higgs Report (2003), commissioned by the British Department of Trade and Industry, suggests that 
demographic diversity increases board effectiveness and recommends that more women should be included on 
boards. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) advises that “the search for board candidates should be 
conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of 
diversity on the board, including gender” (Principle B.2). 
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+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
13
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖
15
𝑘=2
 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                   (𝟏) 
We include a quadratic term of board busyness, Board Busyness
2
,
 
to capture the 
potential non-linear relationship between board busyness and corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity.  
The fixed effects or within estimator technique, is based on a deviation from firm’s 
mean transformations (means for the sample intervals are subtracted from each observation) 
and estimates all coefficients without estimating individual effects (Model 2). Since we are 
interested only in slope coefficients, this transformation is a very convenient one. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑̃ 𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠2̃ 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑠 𝑆𝐷̃ 𝑖𝑡 +  + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑   𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦̃ 𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦̃ 𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑̃ 𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
13
𝑗=2
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (𝟐) 
where the ‘~’ (tilde) notation is used to define demeaned variables, and 
Cash/Liquidit is one of our proxies, i.e. Cash/Net Cash/Slack. (All other variable 
definitions are given in Table 2.1) 
An important issue when dealing with the panel data sets is the estimation of robust 
standard errors. Ignoring correlations between residuals in the estimation process can result in 
bias and inconsistent conclusions. For example, if the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are downward biased, they (standard errors) will be low, and the statistical 
significance of the results may be overestimated (Petersen, 2009; Oikonomou, Brooks and 
Pavelin, 2012). To account for this, we use pooled OLS and fixed effects models with robust 
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standard errors, robust standard errors clustered by industry, as well as Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998) standard errors. We also use a Fama-MacBeth (1973) model that estimates cross-
sectional regression each year and gives the average of the time-series of coefficients from 
annual cross-sectional regressions. This method eliminates the problem of serial correlations 
in the residuals of time-series cross-sectional regressions. 
2.4.2. Results 
The results are reported in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. Columns 1 through 5 report 
estimates from: Model 1, the pooled OLS model with robust standard errors; Model 2, the 
fixed effects model with robust standard errors; Model 3, the fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors clustered by industry; Model 4, the Fama-MacBeth model; and Model 5, the 
fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. Looking at the results 
reported in Table 2.4, we observe that the coefficients of the linear term of board busyness 
are positive and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level), their magnitudes ranging 
from 0.087 to 0.127. These results are consistent with the univariate results in Table 2.3 and 
support the claim that board busyness improves cash holdings in line with the reputational 
hypothesis (and thus providing support for the Hypothesis 1). However, the quadratic terms 
of board busyness variables have negative coefficient estimates  (in the range from -0.192 to -
0.146) and are statistically significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that impact of board 
busyness on corporate cash holdings is negative when board busyness reaches a certain 
threshold level
22
. Thus, the reputation hypothesis is supported as far as the proportion of busy 
directors on a firm’s board does not exceed a certain threshold level; beyond that, the 
busyness hypothesis comes into effect. This evidence supports Hypothesis 3. In terms of 
economic significance, the coefficients from Models 1 – 5 suggest that one standard deviation 
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 The differentiation w.r.t.  Board Busyness results in the following first derivative: 
 𝛽1 + 2 ∗ 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 . The corresponding threshold level of Board Busyness is computed by setting 
this derivative equals to zero. The threshold level of Board Busyness in our sample ranges from 25% to 34% 
depending on the model (i.e., Models 1-5) and dependent variable (i.e., Cash, Nest Cash and Financial Slack).  
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change in board busyness results in a 0.11 standard deviations change in corporate cash 
holdings
23
. 
Table 2.5 reports the results of the analyses of the relationship between firms’ Net 
Cash (the difference between cash holdings and total debt) and board busyness. We find that 
the coefficients of the linear term of board busyness are positive (ranging from 0.084, 0.136, 
0.136, 0.175 and 0.135 in Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively) and are significant at the 1% 
level. These results are consistent with the claim that board busyness improves firms’ net 
cash levels, supporting the reputation hypothesis. However, the coefficients of the quadratic 
term of board busyness are negative (-0.165, -0.232, -0.232, -0.272, and -0.219 in Models 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively) and are statistically significant at the 1% level. These results are 
similar to those in Table 2.4, and suggest that Net Cash initially increases with board 
busyness, but after a threshold is reached, further increases in its busyness results in lower net 
cash level. We find that the turnaround values of the proportion of busy directors on the 
board do not differ much from our results from Table 2.4, ranging from 0.25 to 0.32. In other 
words, companies are likely to increase their net cash levels until the proportion of busy 
directors on their boards reaches a threshold level at the range of 25% - 32%, after which, 
further increases in board busyness are associated with decline in firms’ net cash positions. 
This evidence once again, demonstrates a non-linear relationship between board busyness and 
Net Cash, supporting Hypothesis 3. In terms of economic significance, based on the 
coefficients from the Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, one standard deviation change in board 
busyness results in changes of 0.06, 0.10, 0.10, 0.12, and 0.09 standard deviations in net cash 
levels respectively. 
Table 2.6 reports results of the analyses of the relationship between firms’ financial 
slack and board busyness. The results are similar to the results from Tables 2.4 and 2.5, and 
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 We calculate the change in standard deviation of cash holdings in the following way: (regression coefficient 
for Board Busyness variable x standard deviation of Board Busyness)/standard deviation of the cash holdings. 
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provide clear indication of the existence of a non-linear relationship between board busyness 
and corporate liquidity. The coefficient estimates of board busyness are positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% and at the 10% levels in different models), while those of 
the quadratic term of board busyness are negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
We find that the turnaround points for the proportions of busy directors on the board differ 
marginally from our previous findings, being 0.25, 0.35, 0.35, 0.39, and 0.35 in the Models 1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Once again, this evidence supports the Hypothesis 3. In terms of 
economic significance, the coefficients from the Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicate that one 
standard deviation change in board busyness results in 0.06, 0.10, 0.10, 0.17, and 0.08 
standard deviations change in financial slack levels respectively. 
Proportion of supervisory directors on company board, enters the Models 1-5 with a 
positive sign and is statistically significant, supporting the view that higher levels of board 
independence are beneficial to companies. Board Size, measured as a natural logarithm of the 
total number of directors on the company board, has negative coefficient estimates, 
supporting the view that bigger boards adversely affect company cash holdings and liquidity. 
Board tenure has negative coefficient estimates, but is only statistically significant in the 
Models 1, 2, 3, and 5, indicating that companies with longer tenured boards hold less Cash 
and Net Cash, and have lower Financial Slack. We find a positive relationship between CEO-
Chair Duality and all three measures of corporate liquidity: duality results in higher levels of 
power being concentrated in the hands of one person, who can have greater influence on 
board of directors. We suggest that this positive relation can be explained by the fact that 
duality results in CEOs having greater knowledge and expertise, which might affect their 
level of risk aversion. More powerful CEOs may prefer the safeguards of higher levels of 
corporate cash holdings to protect the company (and themselves) from future possible 
financial difficulties. Our results also show a positive relation between Imported CEOs and 
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firms’ Cash, Net Cash and Slack. Imported CEOs may bring both good connections and 
greater expertise to the company, and help to secure higher cash balances to both safeguard 
future profitable investments and protect their own reputational capital. Directors’ age - a 
proxy for their experience and reputation - is positive in all models, but it is not statistically 
significant in the Cash Model 4, the Net Cash Models 2, 3, and 4, and the Slack Models 3 and 
4. Board diversity measure - the proportion of female directors on the board - exhibits 
positive coefficients, and is statistically significant in the Cash Model 4 and all Net Cash 
models, suggesting that the presence of female directors is likely to improve firms’ positions 
on these two measures. 
With respect to firm characteristics, firm Size (measured as natural logarithm of total 
assets) is negatively related to Cash, Net Cash, and Financial Slack, with all coefficients 
being statistically significant at the 1% level. It might be difficult for large firms to 
accumulate substantial levels of cash, net cash and financial slack given their financial 
commitment levels. There is a positive relation between the Tobin’s Q measure of 
performance and corporate cash holdings and liquidity, suggesting that better performing 
companies can accumulate higher levels of cash reserves, manage their debts more efficiently, 
and generate healthier financial slack. The coefficient estimates for Profitability (measured as 
EBITDA/Total Assets) are mixed - the variable has positive (negative) coefficient estimates 
in the Models 2, 3, and 5 (Models 1 and 4) which are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The negative relation can be explained by the need to invest more in order to generate higher 
profits, which will make it difficult for them to accumulate high cash and net cash balances, 
and keep high level of financial slack. These results complement results from the univariate 
analysis in the Table 2.3, which provide strong indications of a negative relation between 
Profitability and Cash, Net Cash and Slack, with a statistically significant difference in the 
Profitability associated with first (firms with least Cash/Net Cash/Slack) and fourth (firms 
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with most Cash/Net Cash/Slack) quartiles of our cash holding/liquidity proxies (Profitability 
is higher in the first quartile of Cash, Net Cash and Slack than in the fourth quartile). The 
relation between Dividends and our cash holdings/liquidity proxies is positive and 
statistically significant in all models except Models 1 (Cash regressions), and Model 4 (Net 
Cash regressions). Our findings with respect to the effects of firm and governance 
characteristics on corporate cash holdings/liquidity are consistent with those in previous 
literature (see, for example, Opler et al., 1999). 
Our results clearly indicate that the relationship between board busyness and 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity is non-linear. Corporate cash holdings/liquidity increases 
with greater corporate board busyness, but after board busyness reaches the certain threshold 
level, its effect on corporate cash holdings/liquidity becomes negative. Given that busier 
boards represent greater demands on directors’ time, the effectiveness of their monitoring 
may weaken, which in turn results in lower levels of corporate cash holdings/liquidity. 
2.5. Conclusions 
We examine the relationship between board busyness and corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity. We offer new insights by evaluating two conflicting views regarding the 
role of busy directors in corporate decision making and by analysing a large sample of UK-
listed companies over the 1997–2009 time period. One view claims that busy directors are 
good stewards and valuable assets for the companies due to their expertise, reputation and 
business contacts, and improve board decision making (reputational effect). The opposite 
view suggests that busy directors may be ‘too busy to mind the business’, which can create 
serious agency problems and leads to suboptimal corporate policies (busyness effect). 
Our analysis reveals that the relationship between the level of directors’ busyness and 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity is an inverted U-shaped. Companies with busy boards have, 
on average, higher levels of cash, net cash and financial slack, but the value of their cash 
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holdings/liquidity declines when board busyness increases beyond a certain threshold. We 
interpret these results as being consistent with both reputation and busyness effects, and as 
providing strong evidence that board busyness affects firms’ cash holdings and cash 
management behaviours in complex non-linear way. To the extent that cash management is a 
key operational decision that affects firm’s ability to hedge against “future cash flow shocks 
in bad times” (Lins et al., 2010), our findings suggest an important mechanism by which 
boards can affect firms’ hedging strategies. Our results emphasize the importance of 
establishing an optimal level of board busyness to mitigate the agency costs associated with 
excessive cash holdings. Specifically, board busyness affects firms’ cash holdings through 
the quality of directors’ monitoring and advising abilities. Previous literature has solely 
focused on individual director’s busyness: this paper augments the picture by considering 
overall board busyness levels. 
We add to the literature that considers boards as important contributors to firms’ 
health and competitiveness (Falato et al., 2014; McNulty et al., 2013). Our findings also have 
direct implications for the public debate on limiting the number of directorships executives 
should hold. While the National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a 
threshold of three directorships, and the Council of Institutional Investors (2002) argues that 
directors with full-time jobs should not participate in more than two other boards in order to 
guarantee adequate service, we argue that board effectiveness also depends on its overall 
level of busyness, i.e. on the proportion of its board members who have concurrent 
commitments to other businesses. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 2.1. Variable Definitions  
Below, the data variables refer to the corresponding corporate governance variable identifiers 
in the BoardEx annual database and to the corresponding corporate cash holding, liquidity 
and firm characteristics variables identifiers in the Thomson Datastream. 
Variable Definition 
Corporate governance 
 
Board busyness 
 
 
The proportion of board members holding three or more 
directorships on other quoted companies. 
 
Supervisory directors The proportion of supervisory directors on the board. Total 
number of supervisory directors divided by the total number of all 
directors on the board. 
 
Board size Natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. 
 
Board tenure The average number of years directors have served on the board. 
 
Duality Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Board Chair is the same 
person. 
 
Imported CEO The proportion of board members who are CEOs (present or 
retrospective) on other quoted companies. Total number of 
imported CEOs divided by the total number of all directors on the 
board. 
 
Directors’ age The average age of board directors. The sum of all ages divided 
by the number of directors on the board. 
 
Gender The proportion of female directors on the board. Number of 
female directors divided by the total number of all directors. 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 
 
Cash Cash and short-term investments/ book value of total assets: 
WC02001/ WC02999 
Net cash (Cash and short-term investments – total debt)/book value of total 
assets: 
(WC02001– WC03255)/ WC02999 
 
Slack (Cash and marketable securities +0.7accounts receivable + 
0.5inventories – accounts payable)/ book value of total assets: 
(WC02001+0.7*WC02051 + 0.5* WC02101 – WC03040)/ 
WC02999. This measure is based on traditional credit line 
arrangements that enable firms to access operating loans up to the 
value of fifty per cent of their inventories and seventy per cent of 
their accounts receivable (Cleary, 1999). 
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Firm characteristics 
 
 
Size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets: Ln (WC02999) 
 
Profitability EBITDA/ book value of total assets : WC18198/ WC02999 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
(Book value of assets – book value of common equity – balance 
sheet deferred taxes + market value of equity)/book value of total 
assets: (WC02999– WC03501 – WC03263 + MV)/ WC02999 
 
Dividend (Dividends provided/paid-common + Preferred dividend 
requirement)/ book value of total assets: (WC 18192+ WC 
01701)/ WC02999 
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 1,275 firms’ observations for 1997 – 
2009 time period, excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are in the Appendix 1. 
Variables Size, Board Size, Board Tenure, Director’s Age, Dividend, Profitability, and 
Tobin’s Q are winsorised at 1% and 99%. 
 
Mean Min Max Observations 
 
Panel A: cash holding/Liquidity  Characteristics 
    
 
Cash 
 
0.17 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
8945 
Net Cash -0.01 -0.97 1.00 8920 
Slack 
 
0.24 
 
-0.70 
 
1.00 
 
8751 
 
 
Panel B: Director/board characteristics 
    
 
Directorships per director 
 
1.87 
 
1 
 
6.33 
 
8946 
Board busyness 0.22 0.00 1.00 8946 
Proportion of supervisory directors 0.58 0.00 1.00 8946 
Board size 7.86 4.00 16.00 8946 
Board tenure 5.47 0.30 16.69 8790 
Director’s age 54.23 34.00 71.09 8938 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
    
 
Size 
 
12.51 
 
7.00 
 
19.43 
 
8911 
Profitability 0.09 -0.99 1.00 8753 
Tobin’s Q 2.15 0.04 24.95 8753 
Dividend 0.02 0.00 0.81 8806 
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Table 2.3. Firm characteristics by cash/net cash 
This table presents univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of corporate governance and firm characteristics of 1,275 UK-based publicly traded firms excluding 
financial companies for the 1997-2009 time period. The director and board data comes from the BoardEx database, firm data is from Thomson Datastream. Busy boards are the 
boards where the percentage of directors with three or more directorships is greater than or equal to the sample median. Other variables definitions are in the Table 2.1. This table 
displays the means and medians (in parentheses) of various director, board, and firm characteristics for first, second, third, and fourth quartiles of cash (Panel A), net cash (Panel 
B), and slack (Panel C).  The t-statistics is for a difference of means test from the first to the forth quartile of cash/net cash/slack. Each quartile contains approximately 2230 firm 
years.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Cash Quartiles 
 
First 
quartile 
Second 
quartile 
Third 
quartile 
Fourth 
quartile 
t-stat 
(p-val) 
Corporate Cash holding/liquidity 
Cash/Net Cash range 0.00to 0.04 0.04 to 0.10 0.10 to 0.24 0.24 to 1.00  
Cash/Net Cash 0.018 
(0.018) 
0.069 
(0.067) 
0.158 
(0.152) 
0.450 
(0.394) 
111.32*** 
(0.000) 
Director/board characteristics      
Board busyness 0.21 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.2) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
2.03** 
(0.042) 
Proportion of supervisory 
directors 
0.55 
(0.55) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
0.59 
(0.57) 
0.60 
(0.60) 
9.49*** 
(0.000) 
Board size 7.53 
(7.00) 
7.86 
(8.00) 
7.46 
(7.00) 
6.92 
(7.00) 
-8.75*** 
(0.000) 
Board tenure 5.94 
(5.30) 
5.46 
(4.88) 
5.36 
(4.84) 
5.12 
(4.44) 
-7.85*** 
(0.000) 
Director’s age 54.18 
(54.34) 
54.62 
(54.77) 
54.18 
(54.25) 
54.94 
(54.00) 
-1.69* 
(0.091) 
Firm characteristics      
Size 12.72 
(12.34) 
13.10 
(12.95) 
12.55 
(12.12) 
11.69 
(11.11) 
-14.12*** 
(0.000) 
Profitability 0.11 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-13.01*** 
(0.000) 
Tobin’s Q 1.55 
(1.23) 
1.66 
(1.38) 
2.13 
(1.63) 
3.28 
(2.33) 
23.40*** 
(0.000) 
Dividend 0.021 
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.00) 
-5.83*** 
(0.000) 
 
Panel B: Net Cash Quartiles 
First 
quartile 
Second 
quartile 
Third 
quartile 
Fourth 
quartile 
t-stat 
(p-val) 
   
-0.97to -0.22 -0.22 to -0.06 -0.06to 0.16 0.16 to 1.00  
-0.30 
(-0.30) 
-0.13 
(-0.16) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.36 
(0.34) 
150.75*** 
(0.000) 
     
0.24 
(0.23) 
0.23 
(0.2) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
-7.24*** 
(0.000) 
0.60 
(0.60) 
0.59 
(0.58) 
0.57 
(0.57) 
0.56 
(0.57) 
-2.88*** 
(0.004) 
8.29 
(8.00) 
8.45 
(8.00) 
7.76 
(7.00) 
6.98 
(7.00) 
-20.62*** 
(0.000) 
5.53 
(4.96) 
5.63 
(5.03) 
5.60 
(5.00) 
5.13 
(4.39) 
-6.35*** 
(0.000) 
54.47 
(54.64) 
54.66 
(54.88) 
54.25 
(54.33) 
54.57 
(53.67) 
-7.25*** 
(0.000) 
     
13.17 
(13.01) 
13.14 
(12.88) 
12.42 
(12.03) 
11.37 
(10.97) 
-30.48*** 
(0.000) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
-12.48*** 
(0.000) 
1.82 
(1.42) 
1.69 
(1.36) 
1.98 
(1.48) 
3.04 
(2.11) 
23.36*** 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.014) 
0.02 
(0.017) 
0.02 
(0.016) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-4.74*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Firm characteristics by slack quartiles 
This table presents univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of corporate governance and firm 
characteristics of 1,275 UK-based publicly traded firms excluding financial companies for the 1997-2009 time 
period. The director and board data comes from the BoardEx database, firm data is from Thomson Datastream. 
Busy boards are the boards where the percentage of directors with three or more directorships is greater than or 
equal to the sample median. Other variables definitions are in the Table 2.1. This table displays the means and 
medians (in parentheses) of various director, board, and firm characteristics for first, second, third, and fourth 
quartiles of cash (Panel A), net cash (Panel B), and slack (Panel C).  The t-statistics is for a difference of means 
test from the first to the forth quartile of cash/net cash/slack. Each quartile contains approximately 2230 firm 
years.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel C: Slack Quartiles 
 
First 
quartile 
Second 
quartile 
Third 
quartile 
Fourth 
quartile 
t-statis 
(p-val) 
 
Corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity 
   
Slack range -0.70to 0.09 0.09 to 0.20 0.20 to 0.34 0.34 to 1.00  
Slack 0.08 
(0.08) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
0.24 
(0.23) 
0.50 
(0.43) 
136.56*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Director/board 
characteristics 
      
Board busyness 0.23 
(0.20) 
0.23 
(0.2) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
-3.99*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Proportion of 
supervisory directors 
0.58 
(0.57) 
0.59 
(0.57) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
1.78* 
(0.075) 
 
 
Board size 7.95 
(7.00) 
8.32 
(8.00) 
8.05 
(8.00) 
7.24 
(7.00) 
-10.39*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Board tenure 5.38 
(4.86) 
5.77 
(5.13) 
5.54 
(4.99) 
5.27 
(4.56) 
-2.00** 
(0.046) 
 
 
Director’s age 54.26 
(54.36) 
54.55 
(54.63) 
54.29 
(54.50) 
53.85 
(54.00) 
-2.42*** 
(0.020) 
 
 
Firm characteristics       
Size 12.81 
(12.37) 
13.01 
(12.71) 
12.72 
(12.48) 
11.66 
(11.30) 
-19.07*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Profitability 0.08 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
-7.12*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 1.79 
(1.41) 
1.75 
(1.35) 
2.01 
(1.51) 
2.97 
(2.03) 
21.04*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Dividend 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.024) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.85 
(0.395) 
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Table 2.4. Board Busyness and Cash Holdings 
This table reports results from an analysis of cash holdings (dependent variables) in our sample of 
1,275 firms from 1997 to 2009 time period.  Model 1 is a pooled OLS model with year and industry 
dummy and robust standard errors. Model 2 is a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust 
standard errors. Model 3 is a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard errors 
clustered by industry (we use FTAG3 index for the industry affiliation). Model 4 is a Fama-MacBeth 
model. Model 5 is a fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. All variable 
definitions are in Table 2.1. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Model 1 
FE robust 
 
Model 2 
FE robust 
clust 
Model 3 
Fama-
MacBeth 
Model 4 
Driscoll-
Kraay 
Model 5 
Board busyness 0.087*** 
(0.024) 
0.101*** 
(0.030) 
0.102** 
(0.044) 
0.127*** 
(0.034) 
0.099*** 
(0.032) 
Board busyness
2 
-0.156*** 
(0.035) 
-0.152*** 
(0.045) 
-0.152*** 
(0.045) 
-0.192*** 
(0.028) 
-0.146*** 
(0.032) 
Proportion of supervisory 
directors 
0.122*** 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.027) 
0.066*** 
(0.016) 
-0.026 
(0.016) 
Board size 0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.029*** 
(0.114) 
-0.029*** 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.027*** 
(0.005) 
Board tenure -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Duality 0.029*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Director’s age 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Imported CEO 0.116*** 
(0.021) 
0.024 
(0.028) 
0.024 
(0.012) 
0.079*** 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
Gender 
 
0.023 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.034** 
(0.016) 
0.018 
(0.011) 
Size -0.019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.035*** 
(0.007) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.039*** 
(0.005) 
Profitability -0.158*** 
(0.017) 
0.064*** 
(0.018) 
0.0642*** 
(0.012) 
-0.157*** 
(0.003) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
Tobin’s Q 0.023*** 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Dividend 0.116 
(0.085) 
0.161*** 
(0.056) 
0.161*** 
(0.035) 
0.138** 
(0.0634) 
0.146*** 
(0.048) 
Constant 0.036 
(0.031) 
0.436*** 
(0.076) 
0.436*** 
(0.089) 
0.021 
(0.042) 
0.484*** 
0.068 
Year dummy 
Industry dummy 
R
2
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.17 
Yes 
No 
0.04 
Yes 
No 
0.04 
No 
No 
0.17 
No 
No 
0.06 
Number of observations 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 
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Table 2.5. Board Busyness and Net Cash 
This table reports results from an analysis of net cash (dependent variable measured by the difference 
between firm’s cash holdings and firm’s total debt) in our sample of 1,275 firms from 1997 to 2009. 
Model 1 is a pooled OLS model with year and industry dummy and robust standard errors. Model 2 is 
a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard errors. Model 3 is a fixed effects model 
with year dummy and robust standard errors clustered by industry (we use FTAG3 index for the 
industry affiliation). Model 4 is Fama-MacBeth model. Model 5 is a fixed effects model with Driscoll 
and Kraay (1998) standard errors. All variable definitions are in Table 2.1. Standard errors are in 
parenthesises beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Pooled OLS 
 
Model 1 
FE robust 
 
Model 2 
FE robust 
clust 
Model 3 
Fama-
MacBeth 
Model 4 
Driscoll-
Kraay 
Model 5 
 
Board busyness 0.0847*** 
(0.036) 
0.136*** 
(0.045) 
0.136*** 
(0.055) 
0.175*** 
(0.065) 
0.135*** 
(0.046) 
 
Board busyness
2 
-0.165*** 
(0.050) 
-0.232*** 
(0.072) 
-0.232*** 
(0.080) 
-0.272*** 
(0.072) 
-0.219*** 
(0.047) 
 
Proportion of 
supervisory directors 
0.106*** 
(0.021) 
0.027 
(0.033) 
0.027 
(0.029) 
0.052* 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.026) 
 
Board size 0.027** 
(0.012) 
-0.046*** 
(0.017) 
-0.046*** 
(0.019) 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.038*** 
(0.010) 
 
Board tenure -0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
Duality 0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
 
Director’s age 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
Imported CEO 0.192*** 
(0.034) 
-0.017 
(0.052) 
-0.017 
(0.041) 
0.065 
(0.055) 
-0.047 
(0.031) 
 
Gender 
 
0.081*** 
(0.031) 
0.055* 
(0.030) 
0.055* 
(0.029) 
0.154*** 
(0.042) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
 
Size -0.043*** 
(0.002) 
-0.055*** 
(0.009) 
-0.055*** 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.002) 
-0.066*** 
(0.012) 
 
Profitability -0.146*** 
(0.024) 
0.172*** 
(0.026) 
0.172*** 
(0.029) 
-0.100*** 
(0.024) 
0.164*** 
(0.029) 
 
Tobin’s Q 0.028*** 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
Dividend 0.461*** 
(0.110) 
0.273*** 
(0.101) 
0.273*** 
(0.098) 
0.294 
(0.201) 
0.253** 
(0.112) 
 
Constant 0.322*** 
(0.049) 
0.757*** 
(0.116) 
0.757*** 
(0.083) 
0.284*** 
(0.071) 
 
0.835*** 
(0.106) 
 
Year dummy 
Industry dummy 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes                                    
No 
Yes
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
R
2 
0.18 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.09  
Number of observations 8290 8290 8290 8290 8290  
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Table 2.6. Board Busyness and Financial Slack 
This table reports results from an analysis of financial slack (dependent variable) in our sample of 
1,275 firms from 1997 to 2009.  Model 1 is a pooled OLS model with year and industry dummy and 
robust standard errors. Model 2 is a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard errors. 
Model 3 is a fixed effects model with year dummy and robust standard errors clustered by industry 
(we use FTAG3 index for the industry affiliation). Model 4 is Fama-MacBeth model. Model 5 is a 
fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. All variable definitions are in 
Table 2.1. Standard errors are in parenthesises beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Model 1 
FE robust 
 
Model 2 
FE robust 
clust 
Model 3 
Fama-
MacBeth 
Model 4 
Driscoll-
Kraay 
Model 5 
 
Board busyness 
 
0.060** 
(0.026) 
 
0.092*** 
(0.031) 
 
0.092* 
(0.049) 
 
0.138*** 
(0.052) 
 
0.089*** 
(0.028) 
Board busyness
2 
-0.121*** 
(0.036) 
-0.131*** 
(0.046) 
-0.131*** 
(0.055) 
-0.176*** 
(0.037) 
-0.126*** 
(0.030) 
Proportion of supervisory 
directors 
0.113*** 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.024) 
-0.008 
(0.031) 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
Board size 0.040*** 
(0.008) 
-0.019* 
(0.012) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
Board tenure -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Duality 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Director’s age 0.001*** 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Imported CEO 0.115*** 
(0.022) 
0.032 
(0.028) 
0.032* 
(0.020) 
0.075*** 
(0.025) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
Gender 
 
0.018 
(0.022) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
Size -0.0250*** 
(0.015) 
-0.0396*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0396*** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0183*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.042*** 
(0.004) 
Profitability -0.078*** 
(0.017) 
0.098*** 
(0.019) 
0.098*** 
(0.015) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
0.090*** 
(0.018) 
Tobin’s Q 0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Dividend 0.380*** 
(0.084) 
0.192*** 
(0.066) 
0.192*** 
(0.041) 
0.404*** 
(0.060) 
0.176*** 
(0.067) 
Constant 0.072** 
(0.035) 
0.471*** 
(0.075) 
0.471*** 
(0.115) 
0.043 
(0.033) 
0.507*** 
(0.057) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry Dummy Yes No No No No 
R
2 
0.14 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.07 
Number of observations 8151 8151 8151 8151 8151 
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CHAPTER 3 
CEO pay slice and firm value: Evidence from UK panel data 
3.1. Introduction 
Executive compensation has been widely discussed by economics, psychology, 
sociology, and management scholars (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Gerhart and Rynes, 
2003, among others). Prior research in this area addresses issues related to executive pay 
levels (considering differences between companies), pay structures (considering differences 
within companies), or payment delivery systems (considering different forms of payment)
24
. 
Considerable academic attention is given to the relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Leibman, 1998; Bebchul and Fried, 2004, 
among others). The most recent academic work investigates inequality in remuneration 
among top executives and its effect on company outcomes. Lee et al. (2008), Fredrickson et 
al. (2010), Zalewska, (2014a), Forbes et al. (2014) identify an interesting aspect of 
compensation inequality - the dispersion of executives’ remuneration - and find that it affects 
company performance. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005), Murphy and Zabojnik (2007), 
Frydman and Saks (2010), Bebchuk et al. (2011) show that the proportion of the total 
compensation paid to a company’s top five executives received by its CEO - otherwise 
known as ‘CEO pay slice’ (CPS) increases over time and also affects firm performance. 
In this paper we extend research on pay inequality by providing UK evidence.  The 
corporate scandals about ‘fat cats' compensation packages in Britain are a timely reminder 
that the pay-performance problem in the UK context requires further attention
25
. Executive 
                                                          
24
 Tournament, labour market, resource dependence, agency, equity, relative deprivation, distributive justice, 
contingency, expectancy, social comparison, marginal productivity, human capital, and managerial power are 
just some of the alternative theories that have been developed by academics in order to examine different 
executive compensation issues (see Fredrickson et al., 2010).  
25
 See BBC News-Business: “High pay of UK executives corrosive, report says”, 22nd November 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15827683 
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pay has become a major issue in the UK in recent years, with shareholders questioning high 
salaries directors receive while their companies underperform
26 . “There is compelling 
evidence of a disconnect between pay and performance in large UK listed companies.” UK 
Business Secretary Vince Cable told the UK Parliament
27
. David Cameron, the Prime 
Minister of the UK criticised boardroom cronies who helped each other “fill their boots” 
while the country was forced to tighten its belt
28
. The British government has been very 
proactive in tackling compensation-related problems: in 2002, the UK was the first country to 
mandate an annual non-binding shareholder vote on directors’ remuneration (“say on pay”) to 
improve the “accountability, transparency, and performance linkage of executive pay” (Baird 
and Stowasser, 2002). Ferri and Maber (2013) analysing the effect of this legislation on 
compensation practices in British companies, find that it has a negligible effect on the levels 
of CEO compensation and, in fact, is conditional on poor performance. The UK government 
also questioned the effectiveness of this “say on pay”, on the basis that it is only advisory, 
and did not oblige companies to address shareholders concerns. In September 2013, the 
Government has gone one step further and introduced a mandatory “say on pay”. 
Shortcomings in regulation of compensation-related issues have been also addressed by the 
Corporate Governance Code 2010 (The Code), with the particular attention being paid to the 
importance of establishing definite connections between director’s remuneration and firm 
performance
29
. 
                                                          
26
 See the Wall Street Journal – Business: “U.K. Unveils Plan on Executive Pay”, 20th June, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304765304577478172485959522 
27
 See the Guardian: “David Cameron to curb 'fat cat' pay with people power”`, 7th January, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay 
28
 See the Guardian: “David Cameron to curb 'fat cat' pay with people power”, 7th January, 2012, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay: "We've got to deal with the 
merry-go-round where there are too many cases of remuneration committee members sitting on each other's 
boards, patting each other's backs and handing out each other's pay rises," he said. "We need to redefine the 
word 'fair'. We need to try to give people a sense that we have a vision at the end of this, of a fairer, better 
economy, a fairer, better society, where if you work hard and do the right thing you get rewarded” 
29
 Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: “levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain, and 
motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying 
more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be 
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In this study, we aim to shed additional light on the link between executives’ 
compensation and a firm performance in the UK context. In particular, we investigate 
whether pay inequality between CEO and top executives affects performance of British 
companies. We hypothesize that fraction of aggregate compensation of top-five managers 
captured by the CEO personally (the CPS) impacts board effectiveness, which in turn affects 
firm outcomes. In our analysis, we controls for several corporate governance characteristics 
(board composition, board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, and board busyness) and for 
various firm characteristics (company age, company size, ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets, and leverage). We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, comprising 1,401 firms and 6,959 firm-year observations over the 1997 to 
2010 time period. Our empirical methodology includes estimation of panel data by using 
various fixed effects models. 
We find consistent support for the proposition that higher CPS is associated with 
lower firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our results rule out the optimal contracting 
hypothesis, which suggests that high CPS is determined deliberately by a company as the 
motivation incentive (to motivate CEO as well as top executive directors) with the view to 
improve firm outcomes. However, the results strongly support agency 
perspective
30
,suggesting that high CPS level could be due to the agency problem in firm with 
powerful and influential CEO, who rules out the decision making processes and enforces 
board members and compensation committee to set up favourable remuneration packages 
regardless of his/her (and company) performance. In addition, high CPS could demotivate 
those managers nearest to the CEO, destroy team cooperation within the board room, and 
lead to poor board and thus firm performance (via the social comparison effect, inherent to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (The UK Corporate Governance 
Code, June 2010: p.22). 
30
 See Section 3.2 for detailed discussion of theories.  
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British boards
31
). Our results indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for research on firm 
performance, and that its relation with the value of firms is an important issue to be 
considered in the UK context. 
Our study relates to different bodies of literature. First, there is clear evidence from 
the literature that proportion of compensation received by CEO has been trending up over 
time (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005, Frydman and Saks, 2010 among 
others). We add to this stream by investigating the relationship between CPS and firm 
performance in the UK context. Second, we extend the literature analysing the association 
between different corporate governance characteristics and Tobin’s Q. Thus, academics 
discuss the impact of large boards (Yermack, 1996), the presence of staggered boards (e.g., 
Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005), and the weakness of shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009) on firm outcomes and find negative associations between these 
corporate governance characteristics and Tobin’s Q. We contribute to this literature by 
considering another aspect of governance arrangements, the CPS, and its impact on firm 
performance. Finally, our work enhances the literature that analyses different CEO qualities 
and characteristics and their effects on firm outcomes. We highlight CPS as an important 
feature, which can provide additional insights into understanding of CEO compensation – 
firm performance link. This is the first study that we are aware of, that discusses the above 
mentioned aspects in the UK context and investigates the CPS –performance relationship 
using a broad UK-based sample. 
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. We provide a theoretical 
background and develop our hypotheses in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 contains the sample 
description and summary statistics. Section 3.4 outlines the methodology. Section 3.5 
examines the relationship between CPS and firm value. Section 3.6 concludes. 
                                                          
31
 See Zalewska (2014a,b) for detailed discussion of the UK board mechanisms and structures.  
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3.2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
3.2.1. Governance, remuneration incentives, and firm performance 
Executive directors’ compensation and CEO compensation, in particular, are among 
the most important corporate governance arrangements that have been widely discussed by 
academics and practitioners (e.g., Core et al., 2003; Jensen, 2004; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). Prior research on executive compensation has mainly focused on the structure and 
level of compensation packages, and their interrelations with firm performance (Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995; Baber et al., 1996; Hall and 
Liebman, 1998; Lee et al., 2008; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Zalewska, 
2014a among others). Early compensation studies focused on CEO, subsequently expanding 
the scope of analysis to the entire managerial team. For example, Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2003) find that pay-performance sensitivity depends on the nature of director’s 
responsibilities, and increases with executive’s rank. Barron and Waddell (2003) argue that 
higher ranked executives receive greater levels of incentive-based compensation than their 
lower ranked colleagues. Academic literature suggests that pay difference within top 
management has important consequences for functional efficiency of the team and, 
subsequently, on firm performance. Even though researchers confirm existence of the 
relationship between pay inequality and firm performance, there is a disagreement regarding 
the nature of this relationship. Lazear and Roshen (1981), Rosen (1986), Eriksson (1999), 
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001), DeVaro (2006a, 2006b), Lee et al. (2008), Kale et al. 
(2009), Rankin and Sayre (2011) find that pay disparity has a positive effect on company 
performance. Pay inequality encourages managers next to CEO, to work better in order to 
secure next step on the management hierarchy ladder. On the other side, Bloom and Michel 
(2002), Carpenter and Sanders (2002), Fredrickson et al. (2010), Bebchuk et al.(2011), 
Zalewska (2014a), report that a wide remuneration gap among executives affects firm 
47 
 
outcomes in a negative way. 
Bebchuk et al. (2011) introduce a new measure defining the relationship between 
CEO compensation and compensation of other members of the top executive team, the CEO 
pay slice (CPS). CPS is defined as a fraction of total compensation received by firm’s top 
five executive officers (including the CEO), which goes to the CEO. Bebchuk et al. (2011) 
find that high levels of CPS have negative effect on firm outcomes, and argue that CPS can 
be used as a valuable tool for examining firm performance and behaviour. Correa and Lel 
(2014) use CPS in their study investigating the effect of “say on pay” legislation on 
executives’ compensation level and corporate performance. Their findings are in line with 
those in Bebchuk et al. (2011) and reveal negative correlation between CPS and firm value. 
In particular, Correa and Lel (2014) demonstrate that companies with high CPS experience 
greater increase in firm value following enactment of the “say on pay” law, and argue that 
high CPS is an indicator of CEO entrenchment. 
Despite the growing body of literature on executives’ remuneration, there are only a 
handful of studies examining the effect of different aspects of directors’ compensation on 
firm performance using UK data. Conyon and Sadler (2001) examine a small sample of UK 
companies, and find a weak evidence of the positive relationship between executives’ pay 
inequality and firm performance. Gregg et al. (2005) find a weak link between cash 
compensation and performance using a sample of large UK companies, and argue that a 
relationship between executives’ total compensation and share performance is weak. Ozkan 
(2009) examines the link between CEO pay and firm performance using a sample of 390 
companies from the FTSE All Shares Index for the 1999-2005 time period. She reports a 
positive and significant relationship between CEO cash compensation and performance, but 
no connection between total compensation and performance. 
There are few most recent studies discussing the pay inequality using UK-based data 
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that are of particular interest and relevant to our research. Correa and Lel (2014) investigate 
the effect of “say on pay” law on executive compensation, CPS and firm value using a large 
cross-country sample from 39 countries including the UK. They find that CEO pay – firm 
performance links become stronger when “say on pay” laws are implemented, and that 
companies that previously had greater CPS, experience significant performance 
improvements. These findings imply a negative correlation between CEO compensation and 
firm outcomes, and are consistent with results from previous research (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 
2011). Forbes et al.  (2014) criticise CPS as a valuable measure to be used in the analyses of 
pay disparity –corporate performance relationship, and introduces a Gini coefficient as an 
alternative. Zalewska (2014a) analyses the link between remuneration dispersion at executive 
board level and firm performance using a large sample of British companies. She unveils a 
negative relationship between remuneration dispersion and performance,
32
 contrary to 
findings from studies on American firms. She argues that this inconsistency is due to 
substantial differences between American and British boards attributable to “individuals’ 
culturally shaped attitudes” (Zalewska, 2014a: p.5). Zalewska (2014a,b) urges that findings 
on American data are not always universal and must be treated with extreme caution in cases 
where applied to companies outside the US. 
3.2.2. Optimal contracting versus social comparison perspective 
Under the optimal contracting perspective, there is a very strong negative view on the 
effects that high remuneration disparity between CEO and other executive board members 
has on a firm value. Fong et al. (2010) argue that compensation should reflect the manager’s 
ability, but at the same time should not lay the foundation for strong feelings of 
inequality/injustice among peers on the labour market. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
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 This is the one of the first studies (and only one analysing the dispersion-performance link using a sample of 
British companies) that documents a negative relationship between the remuneration dispersion and 
performance. All previous studies agreed that greater pay dispersion improves firm outcomes (see Kale et al., 
2009; Rankin and Sayre, 2011 among others.  
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demonstrate that tournament mechanisms within the executive team can produce negative 
incentives for top executives other than CEO. It is very unlikely that the company will benefit 
from the tournament framework if top executives who are competing for the CEO position 
refuse to cooperate with and even might undermine their rivals. A wide gap between CEO 
compensation and compensation of top executives (the “prize size”) emphasises on the 
importance of the CEO as a “dominant player” (Bebchuk et al., 2011). On one side, it is 
beneficial to have a dominant player as he/she can guarantee clarity, steadiness and reduction 
in the cost of decision making process (Bebchuk et al., 2011). On the other side, a large body 
of literature, starting with Shaw (1932), suggests that group decision making is superior to the 
individual decision making. Moreover, the dominant player approach can lead to resentment 
on the part of other members of the top executive team (Brill, 1993; Cook, 1990). Hicks 
(1963) introduced the notion that large pay differences may have a negative impact on 
employees through feelings of inequity and leads to a weaker dedication increasing a 
dysfunctional conflict, which, in turn, “diminish the efficiency of the team” (Hicks, 1963:p. 
334). Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Levine (1991) build 
up on the earlier work of Hicks (1963) and argue that low pay differences may have a 
positive effect on employees’ diligence and productiveness by creating well-balanced and 
efficient labour relations leading thereby to better outputs. Levine (1991) also demonstrates 
that lower level of pay dispersion leads into better employee cohesiveness and productivity
33
. 
Considering that UK boards are not strongly hierarchical and CEOs are not so powerful in 
Britain compared to their American colleagues (Tom and Wright, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2006), 
a high CPS can impact negatively on team spirit and motivation, weakening board 
effectiveness. This can attenuate firm performance in accordance with the social comparison 
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 This argument is also consistent with research on cooperation in general economic situation (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1988; Lazear, 1989; van den Assem et al., 2012). 
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view
34
. 
High CPS also could indicate the extent to which a CEO uses his/her power and 
influence to serve his/her own interests rather than the interests of shareholders35. The recent 
financial crisis, and the scandals around senior executives’ compensation, brought forward 
the following question: “How much difference can a CEO make…” (Collingwood, 2009: p.1). 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) find that a CEO can be very influential, easy captures the board 
and sets up his/her own pay.  Goergen and Renneboog (2011) reach the same conclusion and 
argue that weak corporate boards are beneficial for CEO’s self-dealing. Bebchuk et al. (2011) 
find that CEO pay slice (CPS) negatively affects firm performance, especially in firms with 
entrenched managers. Thus, a high level of CPS can be viewed as a reflection of significant 
governance problems. 
In contrast to the social comparison view, the optimal contracting theory states that 
CEO compensation is determined by a complex set of factors and reflects CEO talent, ability, 
experience, and career concerns. Optimal compensation reflects the extent to which 
companies are willing to offer ‘tournament’ incentives to top executives other than a CEO. 
Optimal contracting arguments
36
 suggest that high CEO pay - relative to pay of other top 
executives - is determined deliberately by companies as motivation incentive with the view to 
improve firm outcomes. In a typical rank order tournament framework, the best performer is 
promoted to the next level in the managerial hierarchy. The promotion to the next level in the 
managerial hierarchy guarantees a higher pay level, so the framework motivates executive 
directors to exert greater efforts and perform better. Earlier empirical research on labour 
economics (e.g., Bognanno, 2001), and the most recent research in corporate finance (e.g., 
Kale et al., 2009) use the compensation gap between  CEO and lower-rung executives as the 
                                                          
34
 The social comparison theory was introduced by Festinger (1957), and underlines equity theory oriented 
concerns (Adams, 1965). 
35
 See, for example, Bebchuk et al. (2011) who use CPS as a measure of CEO dominance. 
36
 See Edmans and Gabaix (2011) for review. 
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measure of tournament incentives. Lee et al. (2008) and Kale et al. (2009), among others, find 
tournament incentives to be an important mechanism in motivating managers. 
High CEO pay slice (CPS) could be a good indicator of superior CEO capability
37
. 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Fich (2005), and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) argue that labour 
market incentives motivate directors to perform better, because poor performance can result 
in decreased access to additional directorships, career, and reputational benefits.  CEOs are 
inspired by the labour market incentives to act as good stewards on behalf of their companies 
in order to gain and build good reputations and improve their career prospects (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992). 
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that companies intentionally decide to 
set high CPSs to motivate their CEOs and top executives other than CEO.  CEO is motivated 
to be a good steward and make every effort to ensure successful company performance levels, 
because they take care about their own reputation; in turn, top executives, other than CEO, 
are also motivated to perform better while competing for the CEO position. This leads us to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: CPS is positively associated with firm value. 
3.3. Sample selection and data description 
3.3.1. Sample selection 
For this study, we use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. We obtain firms’ financial and market information from Thompson 
Datastream, and corporate governance and directors’ compensation information from 
BoardEx. The sample period is from 1997 to 2010, and it includes all firms whose 
information is available from these two sources. 
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 Bebchuk et al. (2011) state that optimal CPS depends also on the pool of available candidates from the labour 
market 
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The BoardEx database consists of director’s information, including director’s name, 
role title and description, indication of whether he/she is an executive or supervisory director, 
the number of years each director has served on the board and in his/her current role, 
director’s total, cash (direct) and equity compensation,  number of quoted companies’ boards 
currently set by each director. From this database, we obtained data for non-financial firms 
for which there is information available for at least two executive board members and a 
company has a CEO. 
We collected the accounting and stock market data necessary to calculate a 
performance proxy and to control for firm characteristics from Thomson Datastream. The 
following variables were collected at the end of each year: book value of assets, book value 
of common equity, balance sheet deferred taxes, market value of equity, value of total debt, 
and company age. 
We merged the data from BoardEx and Thomson Datastream and ended up with 
unbalanced panel of 1,401 firms and 6,959 observations over the 1997 – 2010 time period38. 
Our definition of CPS is marginally different from definition in Bebchuk et al. (2011). British 
corporate boards are, on average smaller than American boards (Zalewska, 2014a,b). Only 
16% of our sample companies have five or more executive directors at the board level. We 
compute CPS as the fraction of the total compensation paid to a group of minimum two and 
maximum five top executives, that is received by the CEO. We use Tobin’s Q as a key 
measure of corporate performance.  We control for other potential determinants of firm value, 
found to be important in the previous studies (see Bebchuk et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2013; 
Zalewska, 2014a) and include firm size, company age, capital expenditures, and leverage in 
our model. We also collect information about the governance structure of each firm,  such as 
board size, board composition, board busyness, CEO tenure, CEO duality, whether the CEO 
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 The number of observations in Chapter 3 is different from those in Chapter 2. The difference  is due to the 
data availability for the CPS computation. Data required for the CPS computation was not always available for 
all sample companies used in Chapter 2.  
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is  insider or  outsider, i.e. was/was not an employee of the firm before his/her appointment to 
the  CEO position, and information on the compensation of executive directors other than 
CEO. All variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix give 
sample calculation examples for Board Busyness and CPS respectively. 
3.3.2. Data description and summary statistics 
We report summary statistics in Table 3.2
39
. We separate data into variables 
describing firm performance (Panel A); compensation, director characteristics and board 
structure (Panel B); and other firm characteristics (Panel C). The average CEO pay slice 
(CPS) based on the total compensation of up to top five executives including CEO is 45.22%, 
with minimum 0 and maximum 100%. The boards in our sample have on average 7 directors 
with minimum 3 directors and maximum 14 directors. The average proportion of executive 
directors at the board level (Board Composition) is 48.44% with a minimum of 13.51% and a 
maximum 80% of executives at the board. The average CEO tenure is 4.44 years in our 
sample companies, with minimum 0 and maximum 24.70 years. 57.81% of companies in our 
sample have CEOs, who were not employees of the company before (Outside CEO). 
Firm size is, on average 4.35. The leverage level is 17.70% in the average company, 
with maximum leverage standing at 95%, and minimum leverage equals to 0%. Company age 
is, on average, 13.78 years, with the oldest company being in existence for 45 years, and the 
youngest company in our sample just 0.34 years old. The maximum (minimum) ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets is 0.34 (0), with the average being 0.05. The average 
Tobin’s Q is 2.55, with maximum (minimum) Q equals to 20 (1.50). 
Table 3.3 reports CPS descriptive statistics. The statistics are presented for each year 
separately, along with statistics for two sub-samples, before and after year 2002
40
. On 
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 All variables are winzorized to the 1st/99th percentiles. 
40
 In 2002, the UK was the forerunner in mandating that shareholders be allowed a non-binding, or advisory 
vote on executives’ pay (“say on pay”). 
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average, CPS has been growing over the 1997-2010 period. This is consistent with the 
evidence from the literature that proportion of compensation received by CEO has been on an 
upwards trend over time (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005; Frydman and 
Saks, 2010). Introduction of advisory “say on pay” law in 2002 has not changed this 
increasing trend. In particular, mean CPS has been increasing gradually, from 32% in the 
year 1997 to 50% in the year 2010, with an average CPS around 40% before the introduction 
of “say on pay”, i.e. before 2002, and average CPS around 47% upon implementation of this 
law, i.e. from year 2003 onwards.  This is in agreement with results in Ferri and Maber 
(2013) who find that introduction of “say on pay” has a limited effect on the levels of CEO 
compensation. 
3.4. Methodology 
In this section, we examine the effect of CPS on company performance. We follow 
the literature that relates firm performance to various corporate governance characteristics 
and use Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance (see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et 
al., 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Gompers et al., 2003). The CPS definition is adopted from 
Bebchuk et al. (2011) with a minor modification, which was necessary due to the difference 
in board sizes in the UK and US
41
. 
We include control variables that have been considered important in the previous 
literature
42
. We include Board Composition, which is a proportion of executive directors at 
the board level. Considering the nature of data available and difficulties with identifying 
independent directors, we use Board Composition measure as a proxy for board 
independence (a lower proportion of executive directors at the board level is associated with 
higher level of board independence). Previous academic research finds board independence 
important in designing a CEO’s compensation plan. Mehran (1995) argues that with 
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 See Section 3.3.1 for the definition of CPS. 
42
 See, for example, Bebchuk et al. (2011), McNulty et al. (2013), and Zalewska (2014 a,b). 
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increasing proportion of executive directors at the board level, the board grants CEO less 
incentive-based pay. Ozerturk (2005) develops a theoretical model, which supports a positive 
relationship between board independence and performance sensitivity of CEO pay. We also 
control for board size and include natural logarithm of a total number of directors at the board 
level (Board Size). Academics provide controversial evidence on the relation between board 
size and company performance, with some documenting positive (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
Dalton et al., 1998; Jackling and Johl, 2009) while others reporting negative association 
(Yermack, 1996; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). In addition, we control for board 
busyness and include Busy Board variable, defined as a proportion of busy directors 
(directors with three or more directorships) at the board level. Core et al. (1999) and 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that directors can become overcommitted when 
serving on multiple boards, rendering them unable to provide meaningful managerial 
monitoring. Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Jiraporn et al. (2008) argue that boards with busy 
directors are associated with lax corporate governance. Jiraporn et al. (2006) associate busy 
boards with weaker performance and lower firm value. We also include a variable indicating 
that CEO and Chairman is the same person (Duality), which is often used in corporate 
governance literature. We consider CEO Tenure as explanatory variable in our models. 
Bebchuk et al. (2011) suggest that CEO tenure impacts on firm performance. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) argue that CEO propensity to employ more allies to the board will increase 
with his/her tenure, thereby increasing the CEO bargaining power. In line with Bebchuk et al. 
(2011), and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) we also consider a CEO outsider variable. Murphy 
and Zabojnik (2007) document that CEO-outsider receives higher compensation resulting in 
higher level of CPS, which could be an indication of his/her unique skills and not necessarily 
agency problems. 
It is important to recognise that CPS could be endogenously determined, i.e. affected 
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by the factors that are also affect firm performance. To account for this, we use fixed effects 
models, which consider how changes in CPS are associated with changes in firm value. In 
case, if individual heterogeneity is time invariant, the individual effects are considered as 
unknown coefficients and are jointly estimated with independent variables’ coefficients43 as a 
potential solution. A fixed effects model is based on a deviation from companies’ mean 
transformation (firm’s mean for the sample interval is subtracted from each observation) and 
estimates all coefficients without estimating individual effects (Model 1). Since we are 
interested only in slope coefficients, this transformation is very convenient for our analysis. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡̃ = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖?̃? + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡̃ + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡̃ +
 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡̃ + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡̃ + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +̃ 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  ̃ +
 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡̃ + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 ̃ +  𝛽10𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦_𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 ̃ +  
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
13
𝑗=2  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (1) 
 
where the ~ (tilde) defines demeaned variables, and Performanceit  is our performance 
measure, i.e. Tobin’s Q. All other variable definitions are in Table 3.1. 
An important issue when dealing with panel data is the estimation of robust standard 
errors. Ignoring correlation between residuals in the estimation process, results in bias and 
inconsistent conclusion. For example, if standard errors of the estimated coefficients are 
downward biased, the standard errors will be low, and statistical significance of the results 
may be overestimated (Petersen, 2009; Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin, 2012). To account 
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 Another possible method to use is a random effects model. The important difference between these two 
approaches (fixed effects vs. random effects) is that in the fixed effects models, the unobserved heterogeneity is 
treated as individual intercept parameter, which will be "eliminated" from the model during the estimation, so 
that any endogeneity (correlation between explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity) will be dealt 
with. Whereas, using random effects approach, allows us to treat unobserved heterogeneity as composite error 
term and hence, the assumption of independence between independent variables and individual effects is crucial 
for the random effects estimators to be consistent. Considering that unobserved effects such as managerial 
ability, corporate culture, and CEO’s style could affect the random effects model’s assumption of independence 
between individual heterogeneity and explanatory variables could be too strong in our case. Moreover, 
estimating Model (2) using random effects and performing a Hausman tests produces results that strongly 
support the use of fixed effects estimation. (Results of the Hausman test are not reported but are available from 
the author upon request.) 
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for this, we ran fixed effects models with robust standard errors and robust standard errors 
clustered by industry. We also use fixed effects models with Driscoll-Kraay (1988) standard 
errors, which are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. We 
also use industry-adjusted CPS in each firm’s industry at the FTAG3 level in the same year. 
In addition, we examine whether our results are robust to alternative specification of CPS 
based on the total compensation of maximum three (rather than five) executive directors 
(CPS 3 directors). 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 3.4 presents univariate comparison of key descriptive variables by CPS 
quartiles. We are interested particularly in whether the characteristics of companies and 
companies’ boards with high CPS, i.e. companies in the fourth quartile, differ from those 
with low CPS, i.e. companies in the first quartile. We test the hypothesis that the fourth-
quartile firms are different from the first quartile firms using a t-test 
Firms with high CPS appear to differ significantly from those with low CPS. Tobin’s 
Q declines as CPS increases. It declines in the second and third quartiles (as predicted by the 
agency and social comparison arguments) and then increases in the fourth quartile again.  The 
firms with highest CPS are smaller than those with the lowest CPS, although the univariate 
relation between CPS and firm size is not monotonic. Firms in the second quartile are larger 
than firms in the first quartile, whereas firms in the third quartile are smaller than those in the 
first and second quartiles, with firms in the fourth quartile representing the smallest 
companies in the sample. Firms in the first CPS quartile are younger than firms in the fourth 
quartile. The univariate relation between CPS and Capex is not monotonic. Firms in the first 
three CPS quartiles have similar Capex, but firms in the fourth quartile have lower Capex. 
Leverage increases from the first to the fourth quartile of CPS, but it is the same in the second, 
third and fourth quartiles. Board Busyness increases monotonically from the first to the fourth 
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quartile of CPS. The firms with the highest CPS have the busiest boards. Board size declines 
monotonically from the first to the fourth quartile of CPS. Companies in the first quartile of 
CPS have boards that are substantially larger than boards of companies in the fourth quartile. 
Board composition changes in line with the board size and declining monotonically from the 
first to the fourth quartile, which is consistent with the view that CEO can entrench, extract 
rents and increase agency costs, if board is less independent. Proportion of ‘outside’ CEOs 
increases gradually from the first to the fourth quartile suggesting that such directors are more 
valuable assets for companies, and receive relatively higher compensation than other 
executives. 
3.5.2. Multivariate analysis 
In this section we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between 
CPS and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. The regression results are reported in Table 3.5. 
We separately report estimation results using fixed effects models with White (Panel A), 
robust clustered by industry (Panel B), and Driscoll–Kraay (Panel C) standard errors 
correction methods. Our results are consistent and robust to the use of different CPS 
specifications.
44
 The results show a negative relationship between CPS and firm value. Our 
main model is Model 1, with Tobin’s Q being regressed against CPS and our selected firm 
and governance control variables. We find that CPS coefficients are negative in Panels A, B, 
and C and are significant (at the 1% level in Panel A and Panel B, and at the 10% in Panel C). 
In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation change in CPS (equals to 19.21%) 
is associated with a reduction in Tobin’s Q by 11.91% (=19.21 x -0.62). 
In subsequent models, Models 2 and 3 we use alternative specifications of CPS. We 
consider industry-adjusted CPS
45
  (Model 2) and CPS computed using total compensation of 
                                                          
44
 We use industry adjusted CPS and CPS based on top-three executives’ compensation. 
45
 The industry adjustment is made by subtracting industry mean CPS (at the same FTAG3 level) from firm CPS 
in the same year 
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maximum three executive directors (Model 3). The results remain robust to these alternative 
specifications with negative and statistically significant CPS coefficients. These results are 
consistent with the view that high CPS adversely affects firm performance, supporting social 
comparison argument. Our results are in line with results reported in the literature starting 
with Hicks (1963), who introduced the notion that large pay disparity may have a negative 
impact on employees through feeling of inequality and leads to a weaker dedication, 
diminishing efficiency of a team. Our results are in agreement with findings in Bebchuk et al. 
(2011), Correa and Lel (2014), and Zalewska (2014a), who argue that a wide remuneration 
gap among executives affects firm outcomes in a negative way. Throughout our analysis we 
were not able to find support for the optimal selection argument. Considering that UK boards 
are not strongly hierarchical, our results suggest that “tournament incentives” are irrelevant to 
British companies. 
Examining control variables in the regressions, we find some interesting results. One 
of our corporate governance characteristics, Board size, has coefficients that are negative and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level), supporting the view that small boards are more 
efficient and perform better than their large counterparts when it comes to managing 
company performance. Both company size and capital expenditure coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that bigger companies and those with 
higher capital expenditure levels perform better. We also find positive relationship between 
leverage and Tobin’s Q. These findings are in line with findings in previous literature (see 
Bebchuk et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2013; Zalewska, 2014a). 
3.6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate how CPS, the proportion of maximum top-five executive 
directors’ aggregate compensation captured by CEO, affects firm performance. We offer new 
insights into the pay inequality - performance relationship by evaluating three different 
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arguments that are prevalent in the finance and management literature. One view claims that 
CPS level is optimally selected by companies and is a reflection of director’s personal 
abilities, skills and talent (optimal selection argument). Optimally selected high CPS 
distinguishes a company’s CEO and helps to create a good competition spirit within the board 
room resulting in better corporate performance. However, two other views suggest exactly 
opposite: high CPS can be an indicator of agency problems in a company in which a powerful 
CEO extracts unjustified rents (agency argument), and could harm board effectiveness by 
impairing team cohesiveness and motivation (social comparison argument), in either case 
resulting in poor corporate performance 
Our analysis reveals a negative association between CPS and corporate performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. This evidence supports both the agency and social comparison 
arguments. The results of our study are robust for controlling for various firm, board and 
CEO characteristics, including board busyness, board composition, board size, CEO – 
Chairman duality, CEO tenure and whether CEO was an employee in the company before, 
firm size, firm age, value of capital expenditures, and leverage. Our results are also robust to 
the different specifications of CPS. Our findings are in line with Bebchuk et al. (2011), 
Zalewska (2014a), and Correa and Lel (2014). However, this is the first study that we are 
aware of, which investigates the CPS – performance relationship using the broad sample of 
UK-based companies
46
. Even though US and UK are considered to be core representatives of 
the Anglo-Saxon corporate world with identical approach to the corporate governance, there 
are some substantial differences in terms of board structure, culture and cohesiveness (see 
Zalewska, 2014a,b). We find that results from the UK sample are similar to those from 
studies on US companies. However, the underlying reason for the negative relationship 
between CPS and firm performance could differ between the UK and US contexts. 
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 Forbes et al. (2014) use UK FTSE 100 companies in their study of CPS-performance relationship. 
61 
 
Considering the specificity of UK corporate boards (see Zalewska, 2014b), it is natural to put 
forward the social comparison argument as an important reason for the negative associations 
between CPS and firm performance, which we find in this study
47
. 
Given the changes in remuneration practices introduced by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) and the “say on pay” legislation (2013), we argue that CPS is an 
important aspect of firm governance and management that deserves attention of researchers 
and policy makers. The fact that high CPS negatively impacts on firm performance has strong 
implications for the on-going debate on how to reform executive remuneration so that it 
provides the right incentives. It highlights the importance of considering remuneration issues 
at the board rather than at the CEO or at the sectoral or industry levels, and supports the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles
48
. UK corporate governance reforms move 
towards increasing board’s responsibilities for company’s performance, and it is important to 
consider board-wide remuneration issues without narrowing them down simply to the details 
of CEO compensation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 UK companies are generally characterised by high corporate governance standards, but agency problems may 
still exist in some companies. However, considering the attention the business community has given to the issue, 
and the recommendations provided by the most recent   UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), it is natural to 
assume that agency conflicts would be minimal, and that the social comparison argument is more likely to 
explain the negative CPS – performance relationship.  
48
 “The performance-related elem5ents of executive remuneration… should be sensitive to pay and employment 
conditions elsewhere in the group” (Supporting principle, Section D: Remuneration, The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010: p. 22).  
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Table 3.1. Variable Definitions 
The data variables refer to the corresponding compensation and corporate governance 
variable identifiers in the BoardEx annual database and to the corresponding performance and 
firm characteristics variables identifiers in the Thomson Datastream database. 
Variable Definition 
Compensation 
 
CEO pay slice (CPS) 
 
The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum 
top-two and maximum top-five executives, including CEO that is 
received by the CEO. 
 
CEO pay slice (CPS), 
3 directors 
 
The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum 
top-two and maximum top-three executives, including CEO that 
is received by the CEO. 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
Board busyness The proportion of busy directors at the board level. Busy directors 
are defined as directors holding three or more directorships, 
including the “home” company, in the public companies at the 
same time. 
 
Board composition The proportion of executive directors on the board. Total number 
of supervisory directors divided by the total number of all 
directors on the board. 
  
Board size The natural logarithm of the total number of all directors on the 
board. 
 
CEO tenure The   number of years directors have served on the board 
 
Duality Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Chairman is the same 
person 
 
CEO outsider CEO Outsider is a dummy equal to one, if CEO was working at 
the firm for less than one year before becoming CEO. 
  
Performance measure  
Tobin’s Q 
 
(Book value of assets – book value of common equity – balance 
sheet deferred taxes + market value of equity)/book value of total 
assets: (WC02999– WC03501 – WC03263 + MV)/ WC02999 
Firm characteristics 
 
 
Size Natural logarithm of  market value: Ln (MV) 
 
Leverage Total debt/total assets WC03255/ WC02999 
  
Capital expenditures 
 
Company age 
Capital expenditures/ total assets: WC04601/ WC02999 
 
Number of years since company’s information is available on 
Thomson Datastream: BDATE 
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 1401firms over the 1997-2010 period, 
excluding financial firms. All variables are winzorized to the 1st /99th percentiles. All 
variable definitions are in the Table 3.1. 
 
Mean Min Max Obser 
 
Panel A: Performance Measure 
    
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
2.55 
 
0.00 
 
20.00 
 
7649 
     
 
Panel B: Compensation/Director/Board characteristics 
    
 
CPS 
 
0.45 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
7028 
Board composition 0.48 0.20 0.80 7649 
Board busyness 0.17 0.00 0.67 7649 
Board size 1.90 1.10 2.64 7649 
CEO tenure 4.44 0.00 24.40 7649 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
    
 
Size 
 
4.36 
 
-0.22 
 
9.83 
 
7576 
Company Age 13.78 0.34 45.03 7579 
Capex/Total Assets 0.05 0.00 0.34 7631 
Leverage 0.18 0.00 0.95 7648 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics on CEO pay slice (CPS) compensation 
This table presents descriptive statistics (mean, median, maximum and minimum CPS for our sample firms over the period 1997-2010. 
CPS Descriptive Statistics 
YEAR 
 Before SoP After SoP  
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(1997 
-2002) 
(2003 
-2010) 
t-stat 
(p-val) 
Mean 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.47 
 Median 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.37 0.46 
 Maximum 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Observations 37 50 230 351 440 494 560 641 733 819 769 674 612 618 1602 5426 
  
Difference of CPS means 
(before and after SoP) 
                 
12.03 
(0.00) 
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Table 3.4. Firm characteristics by CPS quartiles 
This table presents univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of corporate governance and firm 
characteristics of 1401 firms from the 1997-2010 sample of UK-based publicly traded firms, excluding financial 
firms. The director and board data is from the BoardEx database, firm data is from Thomson Datastream. CEO 
pay slice (CPS) is the fraction of total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and maximum top-five 
executive directors including CEO that is received by CEO. Other variables definitions are in the Table 3.1. The 
table displays the means and medians (in parentheses) of various director, board, and firm characteristics for 
first, second, third, and fourth quartiles of CPS.  The t-statistics is for a difference of means test from the first to 
the forth quartile of CPS. Each quartile contains approximately 1780 firm -years. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
First 
quartile 
Second 
quartile 
Third 
quartile 
Fourth 
quartile 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
 
CPS characteristics    
CPS range 0.00 to 0.0.32 0.32 to 0.44 0.44 to 0.0.58 0.58 to 1.00   
CPS 0.22 
(0.25) 
0.37 
(0.37) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.70 
(0.65) 
127.94*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
CPS, 3 directors 0.22 
(0.30) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.52 
(0.52) 
0.70 
(0.66) 
104.64*** 
(0.000) 
 
Performance       
Tobin’s Q49 2.55 
(1.51) 
2.49 
(1.50) 
2.41 
(1.47) 
2.47 
(1.50) 
-0.72*** 
(0.469) 
 
 
Director/board 
characteristics 
      
Board busyness 0.15 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
7.48*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Board composition 0.56 
(0.57) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.45 
(0.43) 
0.39 
(0.40) 
-41.00*** 
(0.075) 
 
 
Board size 8.00 
(8.00) 
7.62 
(7.00) 
6.69 
(6.00) 
6.25 
(6.00) 
-23.67*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
CEO tenure 4.44 
(2.90) 
4.94 
(3.30) 
4.58 
(2.90) 
3.91 
(2.80) 
-3.43*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
Firm characteristics       
Size 4.60 
(4.50) 
4.83 
(4.76) 
4.33 
(4.14) 
4.28 
(4.13) 
-4.04*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Company age 13.75 
(8.69) 
14.36 
(9.82) 
14.27 
(9.46) 
14.87 
(8.65) 
2.41** 
(0.016) 
 
 
Capex 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-5.11*** 
(0.000) 
 
Leverage 0.17 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.13) 
1.62 
(0.1063) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 The univariate analysis suggests a potential nonlinearity in Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q declines gradually from the 
first to the third quartile but increases again from the third to the fourth quartile. This suggests that at the highest 
CPS level, there is a possibility that companies performance might improve.  
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Table 3.5. CEO Pay Slice (CPS) and Firm Performance 
This table reports results from an analysis of corporate performance measured by Tobin’s Q in our 
sample of 1401 firms from 1997 to 2010.    Panel A shows the regression results obtained by using 
fixed effects models with year dummy variables (not shown) and t-statistic based on White’s standard 
errors.  Panel B shows the regression results obtained by using fixed effects models with year dummy 
variables (not shown)  and t-statistics based on the robust standard errors clustered by industry (we 
use FTAG3 index as an industry identifier). Panel C shows the regression results obtained by using 
fixed effects models with t-statistics based on Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of maximum 
top five executives’ total compensation and is expressed as decimals. CPS 3 directors is the ratio of 
CEO total compensation to the sum of maximum top three executives’ total compensation and is 
expressed as decimals. CPS adjusted is industry-adjusted CPS. The industry adjustment is made by 
subtracting industry mean CPS (at the same FTAG3 level) from firm CPS in the same year. All other 
variable definitions are in Table 3.1. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient 
estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Fixed effects model with White’s corrected standard errors 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) -0.6182*** 
(0.2052) 
  
CPS adjusted 
 
 -0.6533*** 
(0.2043) 
 
CPS, 3 directors 
 
  -0.5308*** 
(0.1780) 
Board busyness -0.4887 
(0.2758) 
-0.4890 
(0.2758) 
-0.5139 
(0.2770) 
Board composition
 
-0.0740 
(0.3934) 
-0.0816 
(0.3914) 
-0.0601 
(0.3826) 
Board size -1.6531*** 
(0.1879) 
-1.6562*** 
(0.1871) 
-1.5946*** 
(0.1839) 
Duality -0.1126 
(0.1603) 
-0.1131 
(0.1603) 
-0.1168 
(0.1613) 
CEO tenure -0.0102 
(0.0098) 
-0.0103 
(0.0098) 
-0.0090 
(0.0010) 
CEO outsider 0.1036 
(0.0928) 
0.1032 
(0.0928) 
0.0923 
(0.0933) 
Size 1.0090*** 
(0.0422) 
1.0090*** 
(0.0422) 
1.0200*** 
(0.0424) 
Company age 
 
-0.1729 
(0.3178) 
-0.1647 
(0.3178) 
-0.2059 
(0.3187) 
Capex 2.3249*** 
(0.6901) 
1.3160*** 
(0.6901) 
2.4900*** 
(0.6922) 
Leverage 1.6539*** 
(0.2558) 
1.1655*** 
(0.2526) 
1.7047*** 
(0.2565) 
Constant 3.4210 
(2.0519) 
3.4210 
(2.0048) 
3.3691 
(2.0319) 
Year dummy 
R
2
 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Number of observations 6959 6959 6959 
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Table 3.5 (cont) 
 
Panel B: Fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered by industry FTAG3 code  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) -0.6182*** 
(0.2161) 
  
CPS adjusted 
 
 -0.6533*** 
(0.2043) 
 
CPS, 3 directors 
 
  -0.5308*** 
(0.1783) 
Board busyness -0.4887 
(0.4485) 
-0.4890 
(0.24472) 
-0.5139 
(0.4523) 
Board composition
 
-0.0740 
(0.4060) 
-0.0103 
(0.0116) 
-0.0601 
(0.3997) 
Board size -1.6531*** 
(0.3478) 
-1.6562*** 
(0.3522) 
-1.5946*** 
(0.3427) 
Duality -0.1126 
(0.2364) 
-0.1131 
(0.2371) 
-0.1168 
(0.2359) 
CEO tenure -0.0102 
(0.0116) 
-0.0103 
(0.0116) 
-0.0090 
(0.0117) 
CEO outsider 0.1036 
(0.1305) 
0.1032 
(0.1307) 
0.0923 
(0.1260) 
Size 1.0090*** 
(0.1361) 
1.0090*** 
(0.1363) 
1.0200*** 
(0.1352) 
Company age 
 
-0.1729 
(0.2990) 
-0.1647 
(0.2942) 
-0.2059 
(0.3083) 
Capex 2.3249 
(1.4852) 
2.3160 
(1.4854) 
2.4900 
(1.4715) 
Leverage 1.6539* 
(0.8179) 
1.6582* 
(0.8164) 
1.7047* 
(0.8095) 
Constant 3.4210 
(2.0048) 
3.1849 
(1.9676) 
3.3691 
(2.0701) 
Year dummy 
R
2
 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Number of observations 6959 6959 6959 
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Table 3.5 (cont) 
Panel C: Fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) -0.6244* 
(0.3204) 
  
CPS adjusted 
 
 -0.6703* 
(0.3211) 
 
CPS, 3 directors 
 
  -0.5939** 
(0.2634) 
Board busyness -0.5411 
(0.4922) 
-0.5411 
(0.4932) 
-0.5615 
(0.5055) 
Board composition
 
-0.0929 
(0.3481) 
-0.1071 
(0.3414) 
-0.0163 
(0.3044) 
Board size -1.7414*** 
(0.2964) 
-1.7458*** 
(0.2952) 
-1.6928*** 
(0.2853) 
Duality -0.1250 
(0.1808) 
-0.1261 
(0.1808) 
-0.1303 
(0.1768) 
CEO tenure -0.0058 
(0.0049) 
-0.0059 
(0.0049) 
-0.0045 
(0.0047) 
CEO outsider 0.1042 
(0.0800) 
0.1036 
(0.0800) 
0.0923 
(0.0776) 
Size 1.0508*** 
(0.1421) 
1.0497*** 
(0.1422) 
1.0606*** 
(0.1410) 
Company age 
 
-0.1341 
(0.0244) 
-0.1427 
(0.0263) 
-0.1355 
(0.0244) 
Capex 2.2312*** 
(0.7026) 
2.2229*** 
(0.6984) 
2.3976*** 
(0.7371) 
Leverage 1.5692*** 
(0.3487) 
1.5725*** 
(0.3478) 
1.6175*** 
(0.3349) 
Constant 2.8560 
(0.8542) 
2.7248 
(0.7756) 
2.6701 
(0.7773) 
Year dummy 
R
2
 
No 
0.15 
No 
0.15 
No 
0.15 
Number of observations 6959 6959 6959 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Corporate governance and stock price crash risk: Evidence from UK 
panel data 
4.1. Introduction 
The finance literature has long examined corporate governance characteristics. Within 
the rapidly developing research on corporate governance, a significant proportion of the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature has concentrated on studying the relationship 
between governance characteristics and stock price crash risk that is of key importance to 
many managers, investors, and academics. Changes in regulations, asset expropriation, 
disruptive product innovations, market crashes can all provoke stock price crashes. Increases 
in stock price crash risk can result in the decline of expected cash flows and NPVs. When 
cash flows fall below investors’ expectations, managers tend to hide the bad news in order to 
protect their own wealth, human capital, and jobs (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom, 1979; 
Benmelech et al., 2010; Gormley and Matsa, 2011). Once negative firm-specific information 
becomes generally realized, stock price drops dramatically (Jin and Myers, 2006), increasing 
stock price crash risk. A considerable body of literature suggests that corporate governance 
mechanisms can help to prevent suboptimal managerial behaviors and so significantly reduce 
the risk of the firm’s stock price crashing. Still, evidence on the impact of corporate 
governance characteristics on stock price crash risk outside the US is limited. 
In this study, we attempt to throw additional light on the links between corporate 
governance characteristics and stock price crashes in the UK. In particular, we investigate 
whether pay inequality between a company’s CEO and the other top executives, as well as 
board ‘busyness’ affect stock price crash risk of British companies. We define pay inequality 
as the proportion of top executives’ total compensation that goes to the CEO – which has 
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been labeled the CEO Pay Slice (CPS); and we measure corporate board busyness by the 
proportion of busy directors (directors with three or more directorships) represented at the 
board level. Our main hypothesis is that companies with high CPS and ‘busy’ boards (which 
are both characteristics of weak corporate governance) are more exposed to stock price crash 
risk, all else equal. Explanations of positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and 
stock price crash risk conform to one of the following theoretical frames. First, high CPS may 
be an indication of CEO centrality. Powerful CEO can influence decision making process 
within the board room according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO 
managerial style (whether conservative or aggressive) has been shown to influence important 
corporate decisions (Malmendier et al., 2011). CPS, as a measure of CEO power connected 
directly to stock price crash risk emerging from the implementation of certain corporate 
policies. Second, high-powered compensation packages, combined with information 
asymmetry, in the situations where boards are busy, magnify agency problems, and can also 
incentivize CEO and top executives to take on decisions that may enhance short term 
performance and so increase exposure to the stock price crash risk. Third, due to information 
asymmetry, it is difficult for outsiders to differentiate between managerial actions that 
generate true positive returns from those that generate high returns in order to help managers 
to camouflage the real situation in their companies and protect their jobs, at least for some 
time. Therefore, carefully considered structures of CEO and top executives’ compensation 
packages, coupled with low pay disparity between top executive team members and good 
quality monitoring from non-busy corporate board may be necessary to control stock price 
crash risk exposures. 
The corporate scandals around “fat cats” compensation packages in Britain50 are a 
reminder that this problem requires further attention. Executive pay has become a major issue 
                                                          
50
 See BBC News-Business: “High Pay of UK executives corrosive, report says”, 22 November 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15827683 
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in recent years in the UK, with shareholders questioning high salaries directors receive
51,52
. 
The British government has been very proactive in tackling compensation-related problems. 
Thus, in 2002, the UK became the first country to mandate an annual non-binding 
shareholder vote on directors’ remuneration (“say on pay”) to improve the “accountability, 
transparency, and performance linkage of executive pay” (Baird and Stowasser, 2002). In 
September 2013, the government went one step further and introduced mandatory ‘say on 
pay’. Shortcomings in regulation of compensation-related issues have been also addressed by 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (The Code), with particular attention being paid to 
the importance of establishing a strong link between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance
53
, as well as responsibilities of directors for risk oversight and management
54
. In 
our analysis we use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, comprising 692 firms over the 1997 to 2010 period. We control for important 
corporate governance characteristics, such as board composition, board size, CEO- Chairman 
duality, and CEO tenure; we also control for various firm-specific characteristics, which are 
company size, ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, and leverage. Our empirical 
methodology includes the use of panel data and a system GMM estimator. By using this 
estimator, we avoid problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity and potential 
                                                          
51
 See The Wall Street Journal – Business: “U.K. Unveils Plan on Executive Pay”, 20 June, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304765304577478172485959522 
52
 “There is compelling evidence of a disconnect between pay and performance in large UK listed companies”, 
UK Business Secretary Vince Cable told Parliament; David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, also criticised 
boardroom cronies who helped each other “fill their boots” while the country was forced to tighten its belt. 
"We've got to deal with the merry-go-round where there are too many cases of remuneration committee 
members sitting on each other's boards, patting each other's backs and handing out each other's pay rises," he 
said. "We need to redefine the word 'fair'. We need to try to give people a sense that we have a vision at the end 
of this, of a fairer, better economy, a fairer, better society, where if you work hard and do the right thing you get 
rewarded” , 7 January, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay 
53
 Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: “Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain, and 
motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying 
more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be 
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (The UK Corporate Governance 
Code, June 2010: p.22). 
54
 Section C2: Risk Management and Internal Control. Main Principle: “The board is responsible for 
determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. 
The board should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems.” 
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endogeneity of regressors. The system GMM estimator is also considered as more efficient 
than other instrumental variable techniques in controlling for the possible endogeneity of 
explanatory variables (see Almeida et al., 2010). 
Throughout our analysis, we find consistent support for the proposition that higher 
CPS and board busyness are associated with higher stock price crash risk. Our results 
strongly support the expropriation and busyness arguments
55
. Thus, a high CPS level could 
be due to an agency problem in firms with powerful and influential CEO
56
, who is able to 
stockpile negative information from the market for financial (expropriation of rents through 
the compensation arrangements)
57
 or non-financial reasons (e.g., empire building with a view 
to expropriating future rents)
58
. However, upon the realization of this (negative) information 
by the market, company’s stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). In 
addition, high CPS could demotivate other executive directors, destroy team cooperation 
within the boardroom, and lead to poor board and firm performance (the so-called social 
comparison effect, which is especially pronounced on the British boards
59
). In turn, busy 
boards are associated with weak corporate governance and also contribute to high agency 
problems.
60
 Therefore, companies with busy corporate boards are likely to experience high 
stock price crash risk. Our results indicate that CPS and board busyness can provide a useful 
tool for research on stock price crash risk, which is an important issue to be considered in the 
UK context. 
Our study is related to different streams of the literature. First, extent research shows 
                                                          
55
 See Section 4.2 of this chapter for detailed discussion of theories.  
56
 High CPS as a form of rent extraction by a dominant CEO, might incentivize a CEO to prioritize short-term 
goals in order to secure his/her own private benefits and expropriate wealth from shareholders. CEO’s short-
termism combined with bad news hoarding, increases company’s exposure to stock price crash risk. 
57
 See Kothari et al., 2009.  
58
 See Ball, 2001. 
59
 See Zalewska (2014a,b) for detailed discussion of UK board mechanisms and structures.  
60
 See Gilson (1990); Lipton and Lorsch (1992); National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) (1996); 
Beasly (1996); Cotter et al. (1997); Core et al. (1999); Brown and Maloney (1999); Shivdasni and Yermack 
(1999); Miwa and Ramseyer (2000); Bohren and Strom (2010); Ferris et al. (2003); Fich and Shivdasani (2006); 
and Cooper and Uzun (2012). 
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that proportion of compensation received by CEOs has been trending up over time (Bebchuk 
and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005, Frydman and Saks, 2010 among others). We add to this 
literature stream by investigating the relationship between CPS and stock price crash risk in 
the UK. Second, we contribute by analyzing the association between different corporate 
governance characteristics and stock price crash risk. Thus, scholars discuss the impact of 
large shareholders and institutional investors (An and Zhang, 2013), the opacity of financial 
reports (Hutton et al., 2009), and CEO incentives and power (Kim et al., 2011a). We 
contribute to this literature by considering other aspects of governance arrangement, the CPS 
and board busyness, and their impact on stock price crash risk. Finally, our work enhances 
the literature that analyzes different CEO qualities and characteristics and their effect on firm 
outcomes. We highlight CPS and board busyness as important features which can provide 
additional insight into understanding the link between corporate governance characteristics 
and stock price crash risk. This is the first study that we are aware of, highlighting the above 
mentioned aspects using the UK-based sample. 
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide theoretical 
background and develop the hypothesis in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains the sample 
description and summary statistics. Section 4.4 outlines the methodology used for the 
analysis. Section 4.5 examines the relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price 
crash risk.  Section 4.6 provides results of additional tests. Section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
4.2.1. Corporate governance and stock price crashes: The existing evidence 
An extensive body of literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms can 
help to prevent sub-optimal managerial behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Healy et al., 
1999). Good corporate governance practices discipline investments (Masulis et al., 2007), 
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prevent earnings management (Xie et al., 2003), improve the information disclosure process 
(Armstrong et al., 2012; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and align the interests of managers 
and shareholders (Benmelech et al., 2010 among others). Ironically, the structure of 
executives’ compensation - which is supposed to align interests of managers and shareholders 
- may also trigger agency problems. Accordingly, Healy (1985), Beneish (1999), Ke (2005), 
Burns and Kedia (2006), Johnson et al. (2009), Kedia and Philippon (2010) argue that stock-
based compensation leads  to accounting fraud, misreporting, and earnings mismanagement, 
followed by the stock price overvaluation and collapse. 
Benmelech et al. (2010) demonstrate that stock-based CEO compensation can cause 
stock price crashes. They identify conditions under which stock-based compensation leads to 
suboptimal investment, misreporting, and a subsequent sharp decline in equity prices. 
Benmelech et al. (2010) argue that CEOs of medium – to high-growth firms initially have to 
invest intensively in order to make a better use of growth opportunities. When growth rates 
slow down, CEOs can camouflage growth decline by making suboptimal investment 
decisions, resulting in subsequent stock price collapse. Kim et al. (2011b) provide empirical 
evidence supporting results of Benmelech et al. (2010). 
An and Zhang (2013) explore the relationship between institutional investors’ 
ownership and stock price crash risk, and conclude that strong monitoring by dedicated 
institutional investors attenuates managers’ bad-news hoarding, and so prevents rapid stock 
price drop. Andreou et al. (2013) consider several corporate governance characteristics and 
their effects on firm-specific future stock price crashes. They find that future stock price 
crashes are positively related to institutional ownership, percentage of directors who hold 
company’s shares, and opacity of financial reports. Conversely, the percentage of 
independent directors on the audit committee and auditor’s industry experience are negatively 
related to stock price crashes. 
75 
 
Gormley et al. (2013) consider unanticipated changes in firm’s business environments, 
which lead to increased stock price crash risks. Gormley et al. (2013) examine managers’ 
reaction to increases in business risks as a function of their pre-existing equity-based 
incentives. They find that the structure of managerial compensation has an important effect 
on managerial motivation to induce firm’s level of risk and firm’s response to stock price 
crash risks
61
. These findings are consistent with those in Gormley and Matsa (2011), who 
argue that agency conflicts can be mitigated by reducing managers’ exposure to firm risk62. 
CEO’s management style can also influence firm risk. Managerial style affects 
corporate risk management throughout the impact that personal CEO characteristics have on 
vital corporate decisions and policies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that all investment, 
financing, and other organizational policies depend on specific managerial attributes. They 
argue that older managers are more conservative, while managers who hold an MBA degree 
are more aggressive. Malmendier et al. (2011) find that CEO’s previous experience and 
his/her personal expertise gained over the prior crises (the “Depression baby” effect), 
influence companies’ financing and investment policies. Malmendier et al. (2011) also state 
that overconfident CEOs believe that all their decisions are value maximizing, and boards 
have to use various tools in order to constrain such CEOs. They argue that executives’ 
compensation packages need to account for the particular managerial style (conservative or 
aggressive) arising from managers’ past experience to make financial incentives effective. 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) investigate the importance of risk control for bank holding 
companies (BHC). They hypothesize that company’s risk culture63 determines both the risk 
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 Gormley et al. (2013) recommend that, in designing executives’ compensation packages, boards should 
consider the potential changes in companies’ risk environment and how executives will respond given their 
compensation levels. 
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 Gormley and Matsa (2011) advise that executives’ exposure to firm risk can be reduced if the stock-based 
component in their compensation packages is reduced. 
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 Kimbrough and Componation (2009) argue that company’s organisational culture plays an important role in 
areas such as implementation of new initiatives, its reaction to changes in the market and its ability to navigate 
major changes in its business environment. 
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appetite and the strength of the risk management system. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) 
differentiate between risk cultures that follow “business model channel” or “hedging 
channel”64.  Conservative (aggressive) companies with “business model channel” culture take 
lower (higher) risk and have stronger (weaker) risk management in place; in contrast, under 
the “hedging channel” culture, aggressive (conservative) companies undertake high (low) risk 
coupled with a strong (weak) risk management. By evaluating companies’ response to 
unexpected losses during the 1998 Russian crisis, they find evidence supporting the business 
model channel culture, i.e., companies with high tail risk had a weaker risk management 
system in place. This result is consistent with findings in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), who 
argue that financial institutions which performed worst during the 1998 crisis also 
demonstrated the worst performance during the 2007- 2008 crisis. 
4.2.2. CPS and stock price crash risk. 
Weak corporate governance can result in CEO-dominated firms (Jiraporn et al., 2006). 
The importance of a “dominant player” in corporate decision making cannot be 
underestimated (Bebchuk et al., 2011). However, there is a risk that influential CEO can hide 
problems from the board (Jiraporn et al., 2006; Walkling, 2010). If the board does not have 
all necessary information, the board becomes less effective and problems are likely to remain 
hidden until “revealed by a disaster” (Walkling, 2010: p.17). There is also an exposure to 
expropriation risk, which results from rent extractions by dominant CEOs (Walkling, 2010). 
Rent extraction by company insiders, including CEOs affects corporate investment, cost of 
funds, company growth, and stock returns (see Becht et al., 2003). 
To identify CEO dominancy, Bebchuk et al. (2011) use ‘CEO pay slice (CPS)’ - the 
proportion of the aggregate salary of top five executive directors that goes to the CEO. High 
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 The latter so called because it is consistent with the main predictions of hedging theories in Smith and Stulz 
(1985);and in Froot et al. (1993) (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). 
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CPS level signals agency problems in companies with dominant CEO and weak corporate 
governance. A powerful and authoritative CEO is able to influence the structure of his/her 
own compensation contract in a way that allows him/her to expropriate rents at the expense 
of shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jiraporn et al., 2006). Studies by Yermack (1995) 
and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) determine that some features of compensation 
packages reflect rent-seeking by executives. Jiraporn et al. (2006) - investigate the 
relationship between CEO compensation and corporate governance
65
, and also find evidence 
supporting the rent expropriation argument. 
We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) and interpret a high CPS as a sign of a CEO 
centrality. A dominant CEO could influence decision making processes within a board room 
according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO managerial style 
(conservative or aggressive) influences important corporate decisions (Malmendier et al.  
2011) and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Hence, CPS might be connected 
directly to the stock price crash risk, which emerges as a result of implementation of certain 
corporate policies. High CPS magnifies agency problems, and might incentivize a CEO to 
take on decisions (e.g., financing, investment and dividend decision) that enable him/her to 
extract rents and so expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Thus, for example, a dominant CEO 
could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits, and 
hide true information from the board of directors, so increasing company’s exposure to stock 
price crash risk. These arguments lead us to the following (expropriation) hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: CPS is positively associated with stock price crash risk. 
4.2.3. Busy boards and stock price crash risk 
The agency theory literature suggests that directors who overstretch themselves and 
accept additional seats on more boards due to the associated extra personal  perquisites, tend 
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to spend less time on each individual board, so compromising their responsibilities and 
neglecting their duties (Ferris et al., 2003)
66
. Holding multiple directorships might negatively 
affect monitoring and advisory capacity of the board. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and 
Core et al. (1999) argue that directors with multiple seats “cater for CEOs”, and that multiple 
board appointments correlate with excess CEO compensation, implying that such directors 
serve an inadequate check on management. Busy directors have a higher propensity to be 
absent from board meetings neglecting their duties by not taking part in the strategic 
decisions-making processes (Jiraporn et al., 2008). Beasley (1996) provides evidence that the 
number of board seats held by supervisory directors exhibits positive correlation with 
accounting fraud, and points to the lack of attention from these directors. Busy directors tend 
to take care of their own reputation and to leave underperforming companies, suggesting that 
the presence of overstretched directors may be endogenous to firm performance (Brown and 
Maloney, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Despite the fact that busy directors are proficient and knowledgeable in their field, 
they are not able to use these skills to their full advantage, because their multiple 
responsibilities can create high levels of distraction. Cooper and Uzun (2012) find that 
directors who are less distracted in terms of other directorships and high-level corporate 
responsibilities tend to monitor banks better. Banks with less busy directors are less risky 
than banks with busy directors. Christy et al. (2013) also examine the links between corporate 
governance and equity risk, focusing on the board of directors, and find a negative 
relationship between the market risk of equity and multiple directorships held by independent 
board members. 
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Fich and Shivdasani (2006); Cooper and Uzun (2012) who challenge the wisdom of holding too many 
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Information asymmetry
67
 might be especially pronounced in the presence of busy 
boards, due to the inability of busy directors to provide thorough monitoring and to identify 
problems in a timely manner. Busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in 
severe agency problems, due to poor monitoring. This might result in CEO’s and top 
executives’ short-termism and might increase company’s exposure to stock price crash risk. 
A CEO with a busy board might be incentivized to camouflage real situation in the company 
in order to protect himself/herself from job loss and to secure private benefits, at least for a 
time. However, upon the release of negative firm-specific information, the company faces a 
shock, which leads to the increase in its stock price crash risk. Considering the above 
arguments and results from previous research, we hypothesize that in the presence of busy 
boards, firms are more exposed to the stock price crash risk and propose the following 
(busyness) hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Busy boards are positively associated with stock price crash risk. 
4.2.4. The effect of industry competition and financial crisis on the relationship 
between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk 
Giroud and Mueller (2010) argue that effect of corporate governance on agency 
problem depends on industry competition. When competition is high, ‘bad’ managers are 
penalized by the market and the importance of the monitoring element of corporate 
governance is reduced. 
Johnson et al. (2000), and Lemmon and Lins (2003) among others, advise that stock 
prices of companies with weak corporate governance  drop more when the economy contracts 
because the extraction of private benefits by executives may be greater during recessions, 
when the expected rate of return on investment falls. Companies with higher CPS and busier 
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boards might be exposed to higher stock price crash risk during periods of market instability. 
Considering the above arguments, we hypothesize that effect of CPS and board 
busyness on stock price crash risk might be stronger in the industries with low competition 
and especially pronounced when markets are turbulent. 
Hypothesis 3a: The impact of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is 
stronger in industries with lower level of competition. 
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is 
more pronounced during the recession periods. 
4.3. Sample selection and data description 
4.3.1. The Sample 
We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. We collect firms’ financial and market information from the Thompson 
Datastream, whereas corporate governance and directors’ compensation information is from 
the BoardEx database. The sample period is from 1997 to 2010 and includes all firms whose 
information is available from these two sources. 
The BoardEx database consists of directors’ information, including name, role title 
and description, indication of whether director is executive or supervisory director, the 
number of years each director served on the board and in his/her current role, director’s total, 
cash/direct and equity compensation, and the number of quoted companies’ boards on which 
each director currently sits. From this database, we obtain data for non-financial firms for 
which there is information available for at least two executive board members and a company 
has a CEO. 
We collect accounting and stock market data necessary to calculate risk measures and 
to control for firm characteristics from the Thompson Datastream, including weekly prices,
68
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book value of assets, market value of equity, and value of total debt at the end of each year.  
We merge data from BoardEx and Datastream, and select companies with at least five 
consecutive years of data
69
. After all, we have an unbalanced panel of 692 firms over the 
1997 – 2010 time period. 
4.3.2. Variable definition 
We use three proxies for stock price crash risk in our study: Tail Risk, Negative 
Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma. We follow Andreou et al. (2013), and Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013) in our definitions of crash risk proxies. Our first measure is Tail Risk. In a 
given year Tail Risk is defined as the negative of the average return on the company’s stock 
over the 5% of its worst return weeks (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). 
Our second measure is the Extreme Sigma. It is defined as a negative of the worst 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns 
divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (see Andreou et al., 2013). 
Stock price crash is a stochastic process. To evaluate the jumpiness of any stochastic process, 
it is necessary to evaluate movements relevant to the standard deviation of that particular 
process. Thus, crash episodes for each firm are defined relative to the return volatility of that 
particular firm (Hutton et al., 2009). For a given firm i in a year t, the extreme sigma is 
computed as: 
𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑇 = −𝑀𝑖𝑛 [
𝑊𝑖,𝑡−?̅?𝑖,𝑇
𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇
]     (7) 
Where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡is the firm-specific weekly return; ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 is the average firm-specific weekly 
return in the fiscal year, and 𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇 is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns. 
The firm-specific weekly return for firm i in the week t defined as Wi,t= ln(1+εi,t),  where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
represents the residuals from the expanded index model regression (8): 
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𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽5,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
Where ri,t is the return on stock i in the week t, and rm,t is the return on the FTSE All-
share index in the week t. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and include lead and lag variables 
for the market index in a regression which separates market-wide return movements from 
firm returns, so that residuals capture weekly firm-specific returns. 
The third measure is the Negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW). Following Kim 
(2011a, 2011b), An and Zhang (2013) and Andreou (2013) we calculate NCSKEW by taking 
the negative of the third central moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from 
the company’s annual mean return, scaled by the sample variance of firm-specific weekly 
return raised to the power of 3/2. Specifically, we compute NCSKEW for the firm i in fiscal 
year t as: 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝐼,𝑇 = −
[𝑛(𝑛−1)
3
2 ∑ (𝑊𝑖,𝑡−?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
3𝑛
𝑇=1 ]
[(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)(∑ (𝑊𝑖,𝑡− ?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
2𝑛
𝑇=1 )
3
2]
         (9) 
where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the firm-specific weekly return, ?̅?𝑖,𝑇 is the average firm-specific weekly 
return in the fiscal year, and n is the number of observations in the year t. 
Scaling the raw third moment by cubed standard deviation is a standard normalization 
employed for skewness in statistics that allows for a comparison across returns with different 
variances. We follow the literature by putting a minus sign in front of the skewness so that an 
increase in NCSKEW corresponds to more crash risk, i.e., a more negatively-skewed stock 
return distribution. 
Our definition of CPS is marginally different from that in Bebchuk et al. (2011). We 
compute CPS as a fraction of the total compensation of a group of top executives (minimum 
two and maximum five), that is received by the CEO
70
. We follow Ferris et al. (2003) in our 
                                                          
70
British corporate boards are, on average smaller than American boards. Only 16% of our sample companies 
have five or more executive directors at the board level.  
83 
 
definition of busy boards, and consider directors busy if they have seats on boards of three or 
more listed companies. We control for other influences on crash risk, found to be important 
in the previous studies (see Andreou et al., 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013 among others), 
and include firm size, capital expenditures, and leverage in our models. We also collect 
information about each firm’s governance structure, such as board size, board composition, 
CEO tenure, CEO duality, whether the CEO is insider or outsider (i.e. was/was not a firm 
employee before being appointed to the CEO position). Variable definitions are provided in 
Table 4.1.  Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix give sample calculation examples for Board 
Busyness and CPS respectively. 
4.3.3. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.2
71
. We separate our data into variables 
describing crash risk (Panel A); compensation, director characteristics and board structure 
(Panel B); and firm characteristics (Panel C). The mean value of Tail Risk is 0.14, and of 
Negative Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma are 0.12 and 2.88 respectively, which are 
in line with those reported in Andreou et al. (2013), Kim et al. (2011a) and Bradshaw et al. 
(2010). The average CEO pay slice (CPS) based on the total compensation of up to top five 
executives( including CEO) is 44.98% (minimum 0%, maximum 100%). The average board 
busyness is 17.11%, i.e. 17.11% of directors held seats on least two other boards at the same 
time. There are some companies that do not have busy directors at all and some with 66.67% 
busy directors at the board level. The average board in our sample has 7 directors.  The 
average proportion of executive directors at the board level (Board Composition) was 47.89% 
with a minimum of 20% and a maximum 80% of executives represented at the board. The 
average CEO tenure is 5.16 years in our sample companies, with minimum 0 and maximum 
24.70 years. 53.82% of the companies in our sample have CEOs, who had not previously 
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been company employees (Outside CEO). 9% of our sample companies have CEOs who 
chair the board at the same time. 
Firm size is, on average 4.65. Leverage level in the average company is 17.72%, with 
maximum leverage equals to 95%, and minimum leverage equals to 0%. The maximum 
(minimum) ratio of capital expenditures to total assets is 0.34 (0), with the average being 
equal to 0.05. 
4.4. Research design 
We use a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM)
72
 estimator in our analysis. 
The GMM estimator has the following advantages: (1) it allows to include firm fixed effects 
to account for the firm’s unobserved heterogeneity; (2) it considers the impact of previous 
stock price crashes on the current state of corporate governance in a firm; (3) it accounts for 
simultaneity by using a combination of variables from a firm’s history as valid instruments 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). 
We estimate the effect of governance characteristics on risk, conditional on firm 
heterogeneity, by using the following empirical model
73
: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝑘𝑠𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠  s=1,…, p,    (1) 
Where vectors X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm and risk characteristics, 
respectively; 𝛽 captures the effect of governance on firm’s risk; η is an unobserved firm 
effect, and 𝜖𝑖 is a random error term. 
The estimation procedure involves two important steps. First, we take the first 
differences of (1): 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑘𝑝 ∑ ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑍𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜖𝑖𝑡,   𝑝 > 0𝑝     (2) 
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(OLS) and fixed effects estimates. 
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and eliminate all unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. We use GMM to estimate 
(2), and use lagged values of stock price crash risk, corporate governance and firm-specific 
variables as instruments for these variables. There are two important criteria defining the 
validity of these instruments: first, they must provide a source of variation for current 
governance, i.e., 
 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡−𝑘, 𝑋𝑡−𝑘 , 𝑍𝑡−𝑘), where k>p, and X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm, 
and risk characteristics, respectively. Second, lagged values must be exogenous in order to be 
valid instruments. For the exogeniety assumptions to be valid, we need the following 
orthogonality conditions to hold: 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0, ∀𝑠 > 𝑝   (3) 
We can then estimate (2) using GMM and considering orthogonality conditions (3). 
However, there are econometric shortcomings associated with this procedure. First, “if [the] 
original model is conceptually in levels” (Wintoki, 2012: p.588), differencing will reduce the 
variation in the explanatory variables and consequently, the power of the tests (Beck et al.. 
2000). Second, variables in levels may be weak instruments for first-differenced equations 
(Arrelano and Bover, 1995). Third, first differencing may worsen the impact of measurement 
errors on the dependent variables (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that it is possible to 
mitigate these shortcomings and improve the GMM estimator by including the equations in 
levels in the estimation procedure. It is then possible to use first-differenced variables as 
instruments for the equations in levels in a “stacked” system of equations that includes 
equations in both levels and differences, resulting in a system GMM estimator that involves 
estimating the following system: 
[
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡
] = 𝛼 + 𝑘 [
𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝
] + 𝛽 [
𝑋𝑖𝑡
∆𝑋𝑖𝑡
] + 𝛾 [
𝑍𝑖𝑡
∆𝑍𝑖𝑡
] + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (4) 
To deal with unobserved heterogeneity in level equation, we make a reasonable 
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assumption that correlation between governance/firm characteristics and unobserved effects 
(such as, for example managerial ability, managerial productivity, etc.) will be constant over 
time. This assumption requires additional orthogonality conditions: 
𝐸[∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)] = 𝐸[∆𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)] = 𝐸[∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)] = 0, ∀𝑠 > 𝑝 (5) 
We carry out GMM panel estimation considering the orthogonality conditions of (3) 
and (5), and assume no serial correlation in the error term, ϵ. The orthogonality conditions 
imply that we can use lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equations and lagged 
differences as instruments for the level equations, respectively. 
To verify a key exogeniety assumption that the firm’s historical risk and 
characteristics are exogenous with respect to current shocks or innovations in risk, we also 
test for the second-order serial correlation
74
 and over-identification
75
, as suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). 
As a potential concern with our analysis could be that the relationship between 
corporate governance and stock price crash risk is dynamically endogenous, i.e. that 
company’s past stock price crash risk determines both current corporate governance 
arrangements and current risk (see Wintoki et al.(2012) and Ellul and Erramilli (2013)). We 
follow Ellul and Erramilli (2013), and address this concern by analyzing a relationship 
between corporate governance and stock price crash risk using a dynamic panel GMM 
estimator in the following form: 
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 Multiple lags are used as instruments in the dynamic panel GMM model. Hence, the system is over-identified 
and test of over-identification has to be carried out. The Hansen test provides a J-statistic, which is distributed as 
χ2 under the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments. 
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𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡    +  𝛽8𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡   
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
14
𝑗=2
+  𝜀 𝑖𝑡                    (𝟔) 
Where Crash Risk is one of our three proxies for the stock price crash risk defined as 
Tail Risk, Negative Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma. All variable definitions are 
provided in Table 4.1. 
4.5. Results 
In this section we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between 
corporate governance characteristics such as CPS and board busyness and Crash Risk, 
measured by three different proxies, i.e., Tail Risk, Negative Conditional Skewness, and 
Extreme Sigma. Our models include the standard controls used in the literature. Thus, we 
control for firm size (log of firm’s market value), firm capital expenditures and leverage; we 
also control for the board size, board composition, CEO-Chairman duality, CEO tenure, 
whether the CEO is insider (i.e., was a company employee before being appointed CEO) or 
outsider, and year dummy. We run few tests to check for the potential misspecification of our 
estimation model. First, we use the Hansen J statistics of overidentification restrictions to 
check for the validity of our chosen instruments and, second, we use m2 statistics, developed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, and find no such problem in our model. 
The results are displayed in Table 4.3, and provide consistent evidence that corporate 
governance mechanisms are significant and affect stock price crashes. Specifically, we find 
that coefficients on CPS are positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in all our 
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models, indicating that stock price crash risk is higher when CPS is high. High CPS is a form 
of rent extraction by a dominant CEO, who serves his own interests instead of interests of 
shareholders.  High CPS might incentivize a CEO to prioritize short-term goals in order to 
secure his/her own private benefits and expropriate wealth from shareholders. In addition, an 
influential CEO can hide problems from the board for some time until bad news is “revealed 
by disaster” (Walkling, 2010: p.17). CEO’s short-termism combined with bad news hoarding, 
increases company’s exposure to stock price crash risk. These results support the 
Expropriation Hypothesis (H1), and are in line with results from existing theoretical and 
empirical literature (see Jiraporn et al., 2006; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2010; and Andreou et al., 
2013 among others). There is also strong evidence that board busyness is positively related to 
stock price crashes. Multiple responsibilities of busy directors create a high level of 
distraction. Information asymmetry is especially pronounced in the presence of busy boards 
due to inability of busy directors to perform comprehensive monitoring and to identify 
problems. In the presence of busy boards, powerful CEO can hide bad news from 
shareholders due to the lack of monitoring from busy directors. As a result, a company’s 
exposure to stock price crash risk increases. The coefficients on board busyness are positive 
and statistically significant (at the 1% level) supporting the Busyness Hypothesis (H2), and 
consistent with the view that companies with busy directors are more at risk of their stock 
price crashing (Cooper and Uzun, 2012; Christy et al., 2013). 
Moving to control variables included in the regressions, we find some interesting 
results. Board Composition, our measure of board independence, has negative and 
statistically significant (at the 1% and 5% levels) coefficients. These results support the view 
that higher level of board independence is beneficial to the company, i.e., companies with 
such boards face lower Stock price crash risk. Board size has positive and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) coefficients, supporting the view that small boards are more 
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efficient and perform better than their larger counterparts when it comes to managing 
company risks. CEO tenure is positive and statistically significant (at 1% and 5% levels) in 
all models, indicating that CEOs with longer tenure may be entrenched, and more likely to 
use their power to camouflage bad news, enhancing companies’ Stock price crash risk. We 
find a negative relationship between the CEO - Chairman Duality and our proxies for the 
stock price crash risk. CEO-Chairman duality results in a higher level of power concentration 
in hands of one person, who can influence a board of directors. The reason for the negative 
relation between duality and stock price crash risk could be that such duality will result in 
better CEO knowledge and expertise, and might affect his/her level of risk aversion. More 
powerful CEOs may be more likely to protect the company and themselves from future 
possible financial inconveniences and make relatively safe investments, associated with 
lower risk levels. Our results reveal a negative relation between Outside CEOs and firms’ 
crash risk. To protect their own reputational capital, outside CEOs may avoid opportunistic 
behavior and bad news hoarding, so minimizing stock price crash risk. 
We also find firm Size (measured as natural logarithm of market value of equity) is 
negatively related to stock price crash risk with all coefficients being statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  The reason for this negative relation might be that larger firms are more 
stable and less exposed to such a risk. Our analysis also reveals that leverage and capital 
expenditures positively affect crash risk. These results are in line with our expectations and 
are in agreement with findings from previous literature (see Kim et al., 2011a, An and Zhang, 
2013). 
4.6. Further tests 
4.6.1. Effect of industry competition on the stock price crashes 
In accordance with agency theory, effective corporate governance helps to alleviate 
managerial opportunism by reducing the information asymmetry that exists between 
90 
 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Effect of corporate governance on 
agency problem depends on industry competition (Giroud and Mueller, 2010). When 
competition is high, ‘bad’ managers are penalized by the market and the importance of the 
monitoring element of corporate governance is reduced. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and 
measure industry competition by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is 
calculated as the sum of squared market shares as follow: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑁𝐽
𝑖=1
 
Where Si,j,t is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market share is 
calculated using firm sales. We estimate industry competition for each of the 15 FTAG3 
industry classifications. High values of HHI values indicate weaker industry competition. 
We split our sample in two groups, high and low competition, based on the value of 
HHI at year t-1 (HHI value lower than the median identifies the high competition group, and 
HHI value higher than the median identifies the low competition group). We re-estimate our 
baseline models from Table 4.3 for the two subsamples separately to identify the impact of 
corporate governance on stock price crashes in the different regimes. The results are shown in 
Table 4.4. The results are consistent with the results from the baseline models from Table 4.3.  
However, we find that the influence of corporate governance on stock price crashes is 
stronger in industries with low competition. These findings are in line with findings of Giroid 
and Mueller (2010), who stress on the importance of effective corporate governance for 
companies in industries where competition is low. 
4.6.2. The effect of corporate governance characteristics during the 2007/2008 
financial crisis 
Johnson et al. (2000) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) among others, argue that stock 
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prices of companies with weak corporate governance drop more when economy contracts. 
This is due to the extraction of private benefits by executives, which may be greater during 
recessions, when the expected rate of return on investment falls. We investigate the effect of 
corporate governance on stock price crashes during the recent financial crisis. We follow An 
and Zhang (2013) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and identify years 2007 and 2008 as the 
crisis years. We use a dummy variable for the crisis years, and include it in our baseline 
model from Table 4.3. We also check whether CPS and board busyness have more 
pronounced effects on the stock price crashes during these years by including the interaction 
variables, CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The results are represented in Table 4.5. 
When Tail Risk is used as a proxy for the stock price crash, the Crisis variable is 
positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level), indicating the increased stock price 
crash risk of firms during the financial crisis. Other variables of interest are the interaction 
variables CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The impact of CPS during the crisis 
becomes negative and statistically significant when Tail risk is used as a measure of stock 
price crash risk. A plausible explanation is that high CPS motivates CEO to perform better 
during turbulent periods, i.e., if CEO with high CPS can manage to reduce stock price crash 
risk during the crisis years, he/she continues to enjoy career benefits in form of high CPS. 
However, Board_Busyness x Crisis is not significant at the conventional level, which 
suggests that the association between board busyness and stock price crash risk is not 
significantly different during the financial crisis. When Negative Conditional skewness is 
used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the Crisis variable is also positive and statistically 
significant (at the 10% level) indicating that stock price crash during the financial crisis 
increases. The impact of CPS during the crisis becomes negative, but is not statistically 
significant, while Board_Busyness x Crisis is positive and significant (at the 1% level), 
suggesting that firms with busy boards were more exposed to stock price crash risk during the 
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crisis years. When Extreme Sigma is used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the impact of 
CPS during the crisis becomes negative but is not statistically significant. Board_Busyness x 
Crisis is also positive and significant (at the 5% level), which suggests that firms with busy 
boards face higher stock price crash risks during the crisis years.  
Overall, the results from Table 4.5 provide some indication that the financial crisis 
affects stock price crash risk in a positive way. The reason for this might be that higher 
market volatility results in a higher stock price crash risk during the financial crisis years (An 
and Zhang, 2013). The results also suggest that during the crisis years, CPS could have a 
negative impact on stock price crash risk of firms. The plausible explanation for this may be 
that high CPS motivates CEO to work hard and perform better during the crisis years. Good 
performance during the turbulent periods improves CEO reputation and guarantees career 
benefits in form of high CPS. Board busyness affects stock price crash risk in a positive way.  
Considering that board busyness is a proxy for weak corporate governance, our results are in 
agreement with Johnson et al. (2000) and Lemmon and Lins (2003), who argue that stock 
prices of companies with weak corporate governance contract more during the turbulent 
periods. 
4.7. Conclusions 
We investigate how governance characteristics affect firms’ risk of experiencing a 
stock price crash. In our analysis, we use governance variables that capture board busyness 
and so-called CEO centrality. We use CEO pay slice (CPS) as a proxy for the CEO centrality 
and estimate board busyness as a proportion of busy directors on a firm’s board. We offer 
new insights by evaluating the role of CPS and Board Busyness on the stock price crash risk 
by analyzing Expropriation and Busyness Hypotheses. 
High CPS magnifies agency problems and might incentivize a CEO to take on 
decisions that enable to extract rents and expropriate shareholder wealth. A dominant CEO 
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could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits and hide 
true information from the board of directors increasing company’s exposure to stock price 
crash risks. In turn, busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in the severe 
agency problem; they (busy boards) might be unable to monitor management effectively. 
Weak corporate boards encourage CEO’s opportunistic behaviors and short-termism and 
company’s exposure to stock price crash risks increases. 
Our analysis reveals a positive association between CPS, board busyness and stock 
price crash risk. Companies with high CPS and busy boards tend to be more exposed to stock 
price crash risks. The results of our study are robust when controlling for various firm, board 
and CEO characteristics, including board composition, board size, CEO/Chairman duality, 
CEO tenure and whether CEO was previously a company employee, as well as firm size, 
value of capital expenditures, and leverage; and to different regime specifications, including 
different levels of industry competition. Our findings are in line with findings in Andreou et 
al. (2013), An and Zhang (2013), and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). However, this is the first 
study that we are aware of which investigates the governance – stock price crash risk 
relationship using the UK-based sample. 
Motivated by the changes in remuneration practices introduced by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) and the “say on pay” law (2013), we find that CPS is an important 
aspect of firm governance and management that deserves attention of both researches and 
policy makers.  The fact that CPS positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong 
implication for the on-going debate about how to reform executive remuneration so that it 
provides the right incentives. Our findings highlight the importance of considering 
remuneration issues at the board, rather than just at the CEO level, and support The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles
76
. Even if a CEO compensation package is 
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 “The performance-related elements of executive remuneration… should be sensitive to pay and employment 
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perfectly structured and implemented, it does not guarantee that it will lead to improvements 
in the firm riskiness, as it may provoke resistance of other board members. As corporate 
governance reforms move towards increasing boards’ responsibilities for risk and 
performance, it is important to consider board-wide remuneration issues without narrowing 
them to the CEO’s compensation. 
There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of 
directorships held by executives from our findings.   While the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a threshold of three directorships, and the Council of 
Institutional Investors (2002) argues that directors with full-time jobs should not participate 
in more than two other boards in order to guarantee that they can give adequate service, we 
argue that board effectiveness depends also on its overall level of busyness, i.e. on the 
proportion of busy directors at the board level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conditions elsewhere in the group” (Supporting principle, Section D: Remuneration, The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010: p. 22).  
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Table 4.1. Variable Definitions 
All data variables in this table refer to the corresponding compensation and corporate 
governance variable identifiers in the BoardEx annual database and to the corresponding risk 
and firm characteristics variables identifiers in the Thomson Datastream database. 
Variable Definition 
Crash Risk 
 
Tail Risk 
 
 
The negative of the average return on the company’s stock over 
the 5% worst return weeks for the company’s stock 
 
Extreme Sigma 
 
The negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns divided by 
the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns 
 
𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑇 = −𝑀𝑖𝑛 [
𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑇
𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇
] 
 
Negative conditional 
skewness 
 
The negative conditional skewness.  we calculate negative 
conditional skewness by taking the negative of the third central 
moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from the 
company’s annual mean return scaled by the sample variance of 
the same raised to the power of 3/2. 
 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝐼,𝑇 = − [𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
3/2 ∑(𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
3
𝑛
𝑇=1
]
/ [(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2) (∑(𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
2
𝑛
𝑇=1
)
3/2
] 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
CEO pay slice (CPS) 
 
 
The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum 
top-two and maximum top-five executives, including CEO that is 
received by the CEO. 
 
Board busyness The proportion of busy directors at the board level. Busy directors 
are defined as directors holding three or more directorships, 
including the “home” company, in the public companies at the 
same time. 
 
Board composition The proportion of executive directors on the board. Total number 
of supervisory directors divided by the total number of all 
directors on the board. 
 
Board size The natural logarithm of the total number of all directors on the 
board. 
 
CEO tenure The   number of years directors have served on the board 
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Duality Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Chairman is the same 
person 
 
CEO outsider CEO Outsider is a dummy equal to one, if CEO was working at 
the firm for less than one year before becoming CEO. 
 
  
 
Firm characteristics 
 
 
Size Natural logarithm of  market value: Ln (MV) 
 
Leverage Total debt/total assets  WC03255/ WC02999 
 
  
Capital expenditures 
 
Capital expenditures/ total assets: WC04601/ WC02999 
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 692 firms for 1997- 2010 time period, 
excluding financial firms. All companies for which data was available from Thomson 
Datastream and BoardEx databases are included in the analysis. Delisted and/or bankrupt 
companies have been excluded as soon as these companies have been delisted and/or 
declared bankruptcy. All variables are winzorized to the 1
st
 /99
th
 percentiles. All variable 
definitions are in the Table 4.1. 
 
Mean Min Max Observation 
 
Panel A: Crash Risk 
    
 
Tail risk 
Negative conditional skewness 
Extreme sigma 
 
0.14 
0.12 
2.88 
 
0.01 
-7.15 
0.37 
 
2.24 
7.18 
6.97 
 
5312 
5312 
5312 
     
 
Panel B: Compensation/Director/ 
Board characteristics 
    
 
CPS 
 
0.45 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
5038 
Board busyness 
Board composition 
0.17 
0.48 
0.00 
0.20 
0.67 
0.80 
5312 
5312 
Board size 1.93 1.10 2.71 5312 
CEO tenure 5.16 0.00 24.70 5312 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
    
 
Size 
 
4.65 
 
-1.90 
 
11.97 
 
5310 
Capex/Total Assets 0.05 0.00 0.34 5302 
Leverage 0.18 0.00 0.95 5311 
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Table 4.3. Corporate Governance Characteristics and Stock price crash risk 
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative 
conditional skewness and extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for 
which corporate governance and financial data are available for at least five consecutive 
years between 1997 and  2010. All companies for which data was available from Thomson 
Datastream and BoardEx databases are included in the analysis. Delisted and/or bankrupt 
companies have been excluded as soon as these companies have been delisted and/or 
declared bankruptcy. All variable definitions are in Table 4.1. mi  is a serial correlation test of 
order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term.  Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient 
estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tail Risk Neg.Cond Skewness Extreme Sigma 
Crash Riskt-1 
 
0.1515*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0760*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0547*** 
(0.0096) 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 0.0585*** 
(0.0058) 
0.3576*** 
(0.1001) 
0.3150*** 
(0.0826) 
Board busyness 0.0922*** 
(0.0118) 
0.5389*** 
(0.1563) 
0.6166*** 
(0.1256) 
Board composition
 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0158) 
-1.1851*** 
(0.2453) 
-0.3803** 
(0.1850) 
Board size 0.1469*** 
(0.0058) 
1.6762*** 
(0.0991) 
1.1753*** 
(0.0834) 
Duality -0.0019*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0524*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0332*** 
(0.0078) 
CEO tenure -0.0017*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0107** 
(0.0049) 
0.0156*** 
(0.0038) 
CEO outsider -0.0019*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0215*** 
(0.0042) 
Size -0.0618*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.4682*** 
(0.0184) 
1.0200*** 
(0.0424) 
Capex 0.0900*** 
(0.0305) 
1.5913*** 
(0.3893) 
1.1100*** 
(0.2700) 
Leverage 0.0565*** 
(0.0113) 
0.6342*** 
(0.1389) 
0.4718*** 
(0.1101) 
Constant 
 
 
m1 
 
m2 
 
Hansen J 
0.1986*** 
(0.0187) 
 
0.000 
 
0.561 
 
0.149 
-0.2751 
(0.2854) 
 
0.000 
 
0.163 
 
0.208 
2.3460*** 
(0.2225) 
 
0.000 
 
0.849 
 
0.270 
 
Year dummy 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of observations 
 
4374 
 
4374 
 
4374 
    
99 
 
Table 4.4. Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The effect of Industry 
Competition 
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional 
skewness and extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate 
governance and financial data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and  2010. 
All companies for which data was available from Thomson Datastream and BoardEx databases are 
included in the analysis. Delisted and/or bankrupt companies have been excluded as soon as these 
companies have been delisted and/or declared bankruptcy.  All variable definitions are in Table 4.1. 
mi  is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term.  Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tail Risk Neg.Cond. Skewness Extreme Sigma 
Industry competition Low High Low High Low High 
Information asymmetry High Low High Low High Low 
Crash Riskt-1 
 
 0.1782*** 
(0.0032) 
 0.0583*** 
(0.0035) 
 0.0886*** 
(0.0048) 
 0.0166*** 
(0.0092) 
 0.0599*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0327*** 
(0.00536) 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS)  0.0625*** 
(0.0041) 
 0.0218*** 
(0.0030) 
 0.6400*** 
(0.0455) 
 0.0826 
(0.0564) 
 0.4107*** 
(0.0348) 
 0.0329*** 
(0.0495) 
Board busyness  0.0970*** 
(0.0054) 
 0.0807*** 
(0.0053) 
 0.8334*** 
(0.0508) 
 0.4435*** 
(0.1019) 
 0.5200*** 
(0.0557) 
 0.6478*** 
(0.0741) 
Board composition
 
 0.0060 
(0.0066) 
-0.0416*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.6668*** 
(0.1011) 
-0.1813 
(0.2453) 
-0.6788*** 
(0.0793) 
 0.1566 
(0.0962) 
Board size  0.1163*** 
(0.0026) 
 0.1271*** 
(0.0033) 
 1.6667*** 
(0.0448) 
 1.6249*** 
(0.0618) 
 1.1538*** 
(0.0272) 
 1.1511*** 
(0.0561) 
Duality  0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0042*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0792*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0038 
(0.0031) 
-0.0460*** 
(0.0043) 
CEO tenure  0.0022*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0321** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0212** 
(0.0033) 
 0.0332*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0125*** 
(0.0024) 
CEO outsider -0.0016*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0319*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0264*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0199*** 
(0.0022) 
Size -0.0638*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0638*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.3830*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.4851*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.3377*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.4226*** 
(0.0092) 
Capex  0.1798*** 
(0.0109) 
 0.1282*** 
(0.0118) 
 0.7245*** 
(0.1194) 
  3.3722*** 
(0.1872) 
 1.0732*** 
(0.0846) 
 1.9189*** 
(0.1800) 
Leverage  0.0364*** 
(0.0042) 
 0.0752*** 
(0.0054) 
 0.1733*** 
(0.0740) 
 0.5840*** 
(0.0850) 
 0.0171*** 
(0.0500) 
 0.2194*** 
(0.0734) 
Constant 
 
m1 
 
m2 
 
Hansen J 
 0.2479*** 
(0.0068) 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.539 
 
 0.882 
 0.2528*** 
(0.0086) 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.226 
 
 0.766 
-1.1722 
(0.1120) 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.100 
 
 0.868 
-0.3828* 
(0.1966) 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.194 
 
 0.708 
 2.2268*** 
(0.0611) 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.376 
 
 0.866 
 2.8838*** 
(0.1581) 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.256 
 
 0.602 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1989 2019 1989 2019 1989 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
Table 4.5. Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The effect of the Financial 
Crisis 2007/2008 
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional 
skewness and extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate 
governance and financial data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and  2010. 
All companies for which data was available from Thomson Datastream and BoardEx databases are 
included in the analysis. Delisted and/or bankrupt companies have been excluded as soon as these 
companies have been delisted and/or declared bankruptcy.  Crisis is a dummy variable, which is equal 
to one for years 2007 and 2008, and zero otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Table 4.1. mi  
is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term.  Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tail Risk Neg.Cond.Skewness Extreme Sigma 
Crash Riskt-1 
 
0.1518*** 
(0.0063) 
0.1532*** 
(0.0063) 
 0.0753*** 
(0.0092) 
 0.0729*** 
(0.0088) 
0.0553*** 
(0.0094) 
0.0579*** 
(0.0536) 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 0.0650*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0568*** 
(0.0063) 
 0.4651*** 
(0.1024) 
 0.3634*** 
(0.0973) 
0.4003*** 
(0.1006) 
0.3323*** 
(0.0851) 
Crisis 0.0316*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0039) 
0.1034 
(0.1288) 
0.1182* 
(0.0653) 
0.1508 
(0.0966) 
0.0170 
(0.0517) 
CPS x Crisis -0.0385*** 
(0.0130) 
 -0.1770 
(0.2558) 
 0.1766 
(0.1955) 
 
Board busyness 0.0834*** 
(0.0054) 
0.1592*** 
(0.0107) 
 0.5638*** 
(0.1570) 
 1.2173*** 
(0.1207) 
0.6401*** 
(0.1323) 
0.9006*** 
(0.1127) 
Board Busyness x 
Crisis 
 0.0091 
(0.0126) 
 -0.4796* 
(0.2574) 
 -0.3373** 
(0.1843) 
Board composition
 -0.0710 
(0.0145) 
-0.0654*** 
(0.0142) 
-1.2638*** 
(0.2410) 
-1.2055*** 
(0.2257) 
-0.4636 
(0.1879) 
-0.3428* 
(0.1956) 
Board size 0.1474*** 
(0.0058) 
0.1453*** 
(0.0059) 
 1.6700*** 
(0.0964) 
1.7064*** 
(0.0965) 
1.1864*** 
(0.0739) 
1.1648*** 
(0.0759) 
Duality -0.0018*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0439*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0309 
(0.0077) 
-0.0290*** 
(0.0074) 
CEO tenure -0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0003) 
 0.0107** 
(0.0048) 
0.0097** 
(0.0048) 
0.0158*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0038) 
CEO outsider -0.0019*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0202*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0220*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0041) 
Size -0.0614*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0602*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.4674*** 
(0.0183) 
-0.4737*** 
(0.0151) 
-0.3927*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.4226*** 
(0.0092) 
Capex 0.0815*** 
(0.0303) 
 0.0814*** 
(0.0304) 
 1.5624*** 
(0.3883) 
1.8559*** 
(0.3348) 
1.1087*** 
(0.2718) 
1.1770*** 
(0.2544) 
Leverage 0.0615*** 
(0.0115) 
 0.0577*** 
(0.0110) 
 0.6429*** 
(0.1406) 
0.4965*** 
(0.1476) 
0.0503*** 
(0.1292) 
0.4555*** 
(0.1306) 
Constant 
 
m1 
 
m2 
 
Hansen J 
0.2027*** 
(0.0180) 
  
0.000 
 
0.568 
 
 
0.151 
 0.1767*** 
(0.0172) 
 
0.000 
 
0.519 
 
 
0.100 
-0.2744 
(0.2764) 
 
0.000 
 
0.161 
 
 
0.208 
-0.4972* 
(0.2854) 
 
0.000 
 
0.194 
 
 
0.708 
2.3411*** 
(0.2274) 
 
0.000 
 
0.817 
 
 
0.278 
2.1834*** 
(0.2189) 
 
0.000 
 
0.856 
 
 
0.311 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
 
4374 
 
4374 
 
4374 
 
4374 
 
4374 
 
4374 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
The present thesis has examined how corporate governance characteristics that have 
been widely discussed by policy makers, regulators, practitioners and academics are related 
to firms’ cash holdings/liquidity, performance and stock price crashes. In particular, we have 
investigated the impact on corporate liquidity, performance and stock price crash risk of two 
governance characteristics that recently emerged from the literature: i) the number of 
directorships held by executive directors or directors’ “busyness”; and ii) the compensation 
inequality between CEO and other executive directors, or CEO “pay slice”. 
Chapter 2 has presented, for the first time in the literature, comprehensive evidence on 
the relationship between board busyness and corporate cash holdings/liquidity and shed 
additional light on the topics of board effectiveness using UK-based sample. In this study we 
offer new insights by evaluating two conflicting views on the role of busy directors in 
corporate boards’ effectiveness by analysing a large sample of UK-listed companies over the 
period 1997 – 2009. One view claims that busy directors are good stewards and valuable 
assets for the companies due to their expertise, reputation and business contacts, and improve 
board decision making ability (reputational effect). The opposite view suggests that busy 
directors are “too busy to mind the business”, and create a serious agency problem (busyness 
effect). 
Throughout our analysis, a series of proxies has been used to measure the level of 
corporate cash holdings/liquidity for each firm in our sample. We have used cash, net cash 
and financial slack, and measured board busyness as a proportion of directors with three or 
more directorships on board. In our tests, we have controlled for the important corporate 
governance characteristics (independence, board size, board tenure, proportion of “imported” 
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CEOs, directors’ age, and gender diversity) and for various firm characteristics (size, 
performance, dividends paid, and profitability). 
Our analysis has revealed that the level of directors’ busyness affects corporate cash 
holdings/liquidity in a complex non-linear manner. Specifically, it is non-linear inverted U-
shaped relationship. This implies that companies with busy boards are likely to have higher 
levels of cash, net cash and financial slack, until the proportion of busy directors on the firm 
board reaches a threshold level; and when the proportion of busy directors goes beyond the 
threshold level, the corporate cash holdings/liquidity decreases. 
Chapter 3 has contributed to the literature by investigating the relationship between 
CPS, the proportion of maximum top-five executive directors’ aggregate compensation 
captured by CEO, and firm’s performance during the 1997 – 2010 time period. Chapter 3 
offers new insights into pay inequality – performance relationship by evaluating three 
different arguments that are prevalent in the corporate finance and management literature. 
One view claims that CPS level is optimally selected by companies and is a reflection of 
director’s personal abilities, skills and talent (optimal selection argument). Optimally selected 
high CPS distinguishes company’s CEO and helps to create a good competition spirit within 
the board room resulting in better corporate performance. Two other views suggest exactly 
opposite:  high CPS can be a sign of agency problems in a company and even could harm 
board effectiveness by destroying team cohesiveness and motivation resulting in a poor 
corporate performance. 
Our analysis reveals a negative association between CPS and corporate performance 
as measured by Tobin’s Q. Companies with high CPSs tend to have lower values in our 
sample. This evidence supports both agency and social comparison arguments. The results of 
our study are robust for controlling for various firm, board and CEO characteristics, including 
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board busyness, board composition, board size, CEO – Chairman duality, CEO tenure and 
whether the CEO was an employee in the company before, firm size, firm age, value of 
capital expenditures, and leverage; and to different specifications of the CPS. Our findings 
are similar to those in Bebchuk et al. (2011), Zalewska (2014a), and Correa and Lel (2014). 
However, this is the first study that we are aware of, which investigates CPS – performance 
relationship using the broad UK-based sample. Considering the specificity of UK corporate 
boards, it is natural to put forward the social comparison argument as an important reason for 
the existence of negative association between the CPS and firm performance. 
Chapter 4 has investigated how governance characteristics affect propensity of firms 
to experience a stock price crash risk. In our analysis we have used governance variables that 
capture board busyness and CEO centrality.  We have used CEO pay slice (CPS) as a proxy 
for CEO centrality and estimate board busyness as a proportion of busy directors at the board 
level. We have offered new insights by evaluating the effect of CPS and Board Busyness on 
stock price crash risk by analysing expropriation and busyness hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 has highlighted that CPS magnifies agency problems and might incentivise 
CEO to take on decisions that enable to extract rents and expropriate shareholder wealth. A 
dominant CEO could prioritise short-term price maximisation to secure his/her own private 
benefits and hide true information from the board of directors increasing company’s exposure 
to the stock crash risk. In turn, busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in the 
severe agency problems, because they might not be able to monitor management effectively. 
Weak corporate boards encourage CEO’s opportunistic behaviour and short-termism and 
company’s exposure to the stock price crash risk increases. 
Our analysis has revealed a positive association between CPS, board busyness and 
stock price crash risk. Companies with high CPS and busy boards tend to be more exposed to 
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stock price crash risk. The results of our study are robust for controlling for various firm, 
board and CEO characteristics, including board composition, board size, CEO – Chairman 
duality, CEO tenure, whether CEO was an employee in the company before, firm size, value 
of capital expenditures, and leverage; and to different regime specifications, including 
different levels of industry competition. Our findings are in line with findings in Andreou et 
al. (2013), An and Zhang (2013), and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). However, this is the first 
study that we are aware of, which investigates governance – stock price crash risk 
relationship using the UK-based sample. 
Motivated by the changes in remuneration practices introduced by The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) and “say on pay” law (2013), we find that CPS and board busyness 
are important aspects of corporate governance which deserve attention of researches and 
policy makers. The fact that CPS negatively impact on firm performance and positively 
impacts on stock crash risk has a strong implication for the on-going debate on how to reform 
executive remuneration so that it provides the right incentives. It highlights the importance of 
considering remuneration issues at a board level, and not at a CEO level. It also supports The 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles
77
. Even if CEO compensation package is 
perfectly structured and implemented, it does not guarantee that it will lead to improvements 
in the firm performance and riskiness, as it may provoke resistance of other board members 
in British companies. As corporate governance reforms move towards increasing boards’ 
responsibilities for risk and performance, it is important to consider board-wide remuneration 
issues without narrowing them to CEO’s compensation. 
There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of 
directorships held by executives from our findings. While the National Association of 
                                                          
77
 “The performance-related elements of executive remuneration… should be sensitive to pay and employment 
conditions elsewhere in the group” (Supporting principle, Section D: Remuneration, The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010: p. 22).  
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Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a threshold of three directorships and the Council of 
Institutional Investors (2002) argues that directors with full-time jobs should not participate 
in more than two other boards in order to guarantee an adequate service, we argue that board 
effectiveness depends also on its overall level of busyness, i.e. on the proportion of the busy 
directors at the board level. 
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Appendix  
Table 1. Calculation of Board Busyness variables 
This is an example calculation for our measures of director busyness using BoardEx database 
data for the SAFEWAY PLC (ISIN GB0000492412) for the year 1997. Total number of 
directorships counts the number of directorships (total number of current quoted boards 
including the “home” company) held by all directors serving on the board. Directorships per 
director are estimated as the total number of directorships held by the directors of the board 
divided by board size. Board Busyness is the number of directors holding three or more board 
seats divided by the board size. 
Director Total Directorships 
Colin Deverell Smith 1 
David Gordon Webster 3 
Gordon  Wotherspoon 1 
Patricia (Pat) Anne O'Driscoll 1 
Robert George Charters 1 
Simon Timothy Laffin 1 
Sir Alistair  Grant 4 
Doctor Neville Clifford Bain 4 
Julia Ann Burdus 4 
Michael John Allen 
 
 
2 
Total Directorships 22 
Directorships per Director 22/10 = 2.2 
Board Busyness 4/10 = 0.4 (40%) 
 
Table 2. Calculation of CPS variables 
This is an example calculation for our measures of CEO pay slice (CPS) using BoardEx 
database data for the AEGIS GROUP PLC (ISIN GB00B4JV1B90) for the year 1997. Total 
compensation is a total compensation including salary, bonuses, and equity-based 
compensation per executive director.  The Rank is an executives’ rank by total compensation. 
The proportion of CEO compensation to the total compensation of total five executives 
including CEO (CPS) is the total compensation of CEO to the sum of total compensations of 
top five executives. 
Director Rank Total Compensation 
Sir Crispin Henry Davis (CEO) 1 971 
Kai  Hiemstra 2 793 
Eryck  Rebbouh 3 483 
Bruno  Kemoun 4 476 
Colin Richard Day 5 432 
Raymond (Ray) F Kelly 6 341 
   
Total Compensation of top five executives  3,155 
Total CEO Compensation  971 
CPS  971/3,155=0.3078 
 
